Three essays on housing market in Hong Kong : implications for public policy and macro economy by WONG, Wai Chung, Gary
Lingnan University 
Digital Commons @ Lingnan University 
Theses & Dissertations Department of Economics 
2010 
Three essays on housing market in Hong Kong : implications for 
public policy and macro economy 
Wai Chung, Gary WONG 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/econ_etd 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Wong, W. C. G. (2010). Three essays on housing market in Hong Kong: Implications for public policy and 
macro economy (Master's thesis, Lingnan University, Hong Kong). Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/
10.14793/econ_etd.2 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at Digital Commons @ 
Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of 
Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. 
Terms of Use 
 
The copyright of this thesis is owned by its 
author. Any reproduction, adaptation, 
distribution or dissemination of this thesis 
without express authorization is strictly 
prohibited.  
 
All rights reserved. 
  
THREE ESSAYS ON HOUSING MARKET IN HONG KONG: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND MACRO ECONOMY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WONG WAI CHUNG GARY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PHD 
 
 
 
 
 
LINGNAN UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 
  
THREE ESSAYS ON HOUSING MARKET IN HONG KONG: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND MACRO ECONOMY 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
WONG Wai Chung Gary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis 
submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Social Sciences 
(Economics) 
 
 
 
 
 
Lingnan University 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 
ABSTRACT 
 
Three Essays on Housing Market in Hong Kong:  
Implications for Public Policy and Macro Economy 
 
by 
 
WONG Wai Chung Gary 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
  The thesis contains three papers on different areas of housing study in Hong 
Kong. The first paper focuses on government policy in public housing privatization 
on housing market and its effect on the overall economy. By comparing the negative 
impacts of two financial crises in 1997 and 2008 on housing market, the paper tries 
to offer explanation for the property downturn during 1997-2003. It aims to study 
how a public housing privatization program would produce adverse effects on 
housing transactions and the economy. The second one links up the housing market 
and macro economy. It is found that housing sector appears to serve as a link 
between exports and domestic expenditures. Housing prices are found to be driven 
by exports and interest rates over a long period, while housing prices in turn drive 
domestic expenditures. The last one attempts to investigate the dynamics of private 
housing market in Hong Kong. Using the cointegarting approach, the paper 
identifies two cointegrating relations, ie. a long run demand side relation between 
property price, prime rate, housing price expectation and GDP per capita, and supply 
side relation between private housing completion, property price, prime rate and 
land cost, which show a short run disequilibrium dynamics in demand and supply of 
private housing during 1985 – 2008.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The thesis contains three papers on different areas of housing study in Hong 
Kong. Expenditures on housing represent the single largest item of expenditures for 
most households in Hong Kong. Expenditures on housing purchases, in particular, 
amount to many years of income (around 8.7 years of median household income in 
2009, research report, Bank of East Asia). Undoubtedly, housing is very important 
element in the macro economy. This thesis focus on few important issues in housing 
economics including demand and supply, privatization of public housing, and the 
relation between housing and marco economy. .  
 
 By comparing the housing market reactions to Asian Financial Crisis, Financial 
Tsunami, the first paper offers alternative explanation for the housing market 
downtown during 1998-2003. It is evidenced that a public housing privatization 
program produced adverse effects on housing transactions and prices in Hong Kong. 
A scheme announced in December 1997, offering tenants an opportunity to buy their 
units at deeply discounted prices, reduced public housing tenants‘ bids for private 
homes and adversely affected home transactions. This effect is more pronounced 
than the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis. An effect on housing prices is also 
indirectly demonstrated through a demonstration that a structural break in the 
housing price relationship occurred at the time the privatization program is 
introduced.   
 
 The second paper shows that, consistent with the ―economic base‖ theory, 
exports drive domestic consumption and domestic investment, but housing appears to 
serve as an important link between exports and domestic expenditures. Focusing on 
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the Hong Kong economy, which is a small open economy with a big population, I 
found that exports and interest rates drive housing prices over a long period, while 
housing prices in turn drive domestic expenditures.  
 
The last one attempts to investigate the disequilibrium dynamics of private 
housing market in Hong Kong. Many empirical researches on housing market are 
traditionally based on the assumption that market is almost in equilibrium status. 
Nevertheless, we can observed that housing market is more often in disequilibrium as 
reflected by cost search, reservation demand and slow response of supply during 
excess demand. Using the cointegarting approach, the paper identifies two 
cointegrating relations, ie. a long run demand side relation between housing property 
price, prime rate, price expectation and income, and supply side relation between 
private housing completion, property price, and land cost, which shows a short run 
disequilibrium dynamics in demand and supply of private housing during 1984 – 
2008. Impulse response and variance decomposition are employed to shed light on 
the dynamics structure in the VECM model. 
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II.  ESSAY ONE 
 
 
Comparing the Effects of the Asian Financial Crisis, Financial 
Tsunami and the Tenants Purchase Scheme: A Study of External 
and Policy Shocks on the Hong Kong Housing Market 
 
 
 
 4 
1.  Introduction 
 
 The Hong Kong economy had been well known for its legendary resilience. 
Despite a number of momentous setbacks, which included the Great Proletariat 
Cultural Revolution in 1966 through 1976, two major oil crises that plunged most 
countries of the world into recession during the 1970s, and several episodes of 
financial and banking crises, not a single year since 1961 was there recorded 
negative economic growth (see Table 1). Indeed the Hang Seng Index plunged from 
over 1,700 in 1973 to little more than 150 in 1975 without causing an economic 
decline in any of these years. The banking crises of 1965-66 ―at a point posed a 
threat to the entire banking system in Hong Kong,‖ (Jao, 1993, p. 242), while those 
of 1982 to 1986 ―were even bigger in scale and produced more far-reaching 
repercussions.‖ (Jao, op.cit.).   
 
Table 1.  Hong Kong‟s Economic Growth 1961-2008 (GDP % change) 
Year % 
change 
Year % 
change 
Year % 
change 
Year % 
change 
Year % 
change 
1961 N.A. 1971 7.2 1981 9.4 1991 5.7 2001 0.5 
1962 14.2 1972 10.5 1982 3.0 1992 6.1 2002 1.8 
1963 15.7 1973 12.3 1983 5.9 1993 6.0 2003 3.0 
1964 8.6 1974 2.3 1984 9.9 1994 6.0 2004 8.5 
1965 14.5 1975 0.4 1985 0.7 1995 2.3 2005 7.1 
1966 1.7 1976 16.2 1986 11.0 1996 4.2 2006 7.0 
1967 1.7 1977 11.8 1987 13.4 1997 5.1 2007 6.4 
1968 3.4 1978 8.4 1988 8.4 1998 -6.0 2008 2.1 
1969 11.3 1979 11.6 1989 2.2 1999 2.6 2009 -2.7 
1970 9.2 1980 10.3 1990 3.9 2000 8.0   
Source: Gross Domestic Product 1961-2008, Government of HKSAR, plus updates from: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/hkecon/gdp/index.htm 
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The Hong Kong economy had suffered under both the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997 and the Global Financial Tsunami in 2008. But the behaviours of the housing 
market during the two crises were very different. Comparing the property price 
movements one year after the outbreak of each financial crisis, property prices fell 
much more dramatically after the outbreak of the AFC, The decline amounted to 
45% from the pre-crisis peak by October 1998 and a further 39% between 1998 and 
2003. One year after the outbreak of the Global Financial Tsunami, housing prices 
were almost at the same level in October 2009 as in September 2008 and even 
reached a new height in 2010 first quarter (Hong Kong Property Review 2008, 
Rating and Valuation Department of HKSAR). Yet the financial tsunami in 2008 is a 
global crisis, and was even said to be the most serious in a century. Indeed, Hong 
Kong‘s exports fell much more in the wake of the global financial tsunami.(Table 3)  
The Hang Seng Index in Oct 2008 was 65% lower than its pre-crisis peak as 
compared to the 60% drop in Aug 1998 during the Asian Financial Crisis (see Table 
2). 
 
The years during and following the Asian Financial Crisis were far less 
tumultuous. Hong Kong‘s major trading partners, the US and Mainland China, 
continued to grow rapidly during the time, while stock market declines were far 
milder than what happened from 1973 to 1975. Moreover, not a single bank failed. 
Yet the Hong Kong economy shrank by 6 per cent in 1998. This turnout deviated so 
much from predictions that Jao referred to it as ―one of the most bizarre and 
egregious failures in the history of economic forecasting.‖ (Jao, 2001, p.140). Table 1 
also shows that the rebound in 1999 is extremely weak, quite unlike the rebounds 
that followed earlier recessions. 
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Table 2.  Indicator of Changes of Confidence/External Shocks 
HSI performance during 
Asian Financial Crisis 
HSI performance during 
Global Financial Tsunami 
Quarter or 
Month 
Hang Seng 
Index 
At End of 
Period 
Year on 
year % 
Change 
(month/ 
Quarterly) 
Quarter or 
Month 
Hang Seng 
Index 
At End of 
Period 
Year on 
year % 
Change 
(month/ 
Quarterly) 
97 Aug 16673*  07 Oct 31638*  
98 Aug 6660# -60.00% 08 Oct 11015# -65.18% 
      
98 Q3 7883  08 Q4 14387  
98 Q4 10049 27.48% 09 Q1 13576 -5.64% 
99 Q1 10942 8.89% 09 Q2 18378 35.38% 
99 Q2 13532 23.67% 09 Q3 20955 14.02% 
Source: http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=^HSI  * = pre-crisis peak   # = bottom 
 
 
Table 3.  Indicator of External Shocks 
Exports Sector performance during 
Asian Financial Crisis  
Exports Sector performance during 
Global Financial Tsunami  
Quarter  HK$ 
million  
Year on 
year % 
Change 
Quarter HK$ 
million 
Year on 
year % 
Change 
98 Q1 295,463  1.0 08 Q3 755,018  1.3 
98 Q2 332,348  -0.6 08 Q4 712,987  -4.9 
98 Q3 339,062  -7.3 09 Q1 513,309  -22.7 
98 Q4 331,053  -9.9 09 Q2 621,064  -12.8 
99 Q1 281,301  -4.8 09 Q3 655,043  -13.2 
99 Q2 325,517  -2.1 09 Q4 692,651  -2.9 
Note:   HK$ chained (2008)  
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, Census & Statistics Dept of HKSAR, various 
years. 
 
The often-cited explanation for Hong Kong‘s deep recession, that the AFC burst 
the property price bubble and thus produced a gigantic negative wealth effect, is 
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simply unconvincing (Jao, 2001, p.140). The transmission mechanism whereby the 
AFC burst the property price bubble is not clear. First, although foreign participation 
in the office building sector was indeed quite significant, foreign participation in the 
housing market has never been significant. There is no evidence that a big 
withdrawal of foreign capital from the housing market produced a collapse. Second, 
although inter-bank interest rates went up in the wake of the currency troubles in 
South East Asia, mortgage rates had been relatively stable. Hong Kong had seen 
bigger mortgage rate hikes before but had never encountered such serious depression 
in the housing market.
1
 Third, it is not true that confidence collapsed overnight. 
Indicators suggest that people had regained confidence not long after the Asian 
Financial Crisis (Table 2).  
 
It is sometimes thought that with the opening up of China Hong Kong‘s 
middleman role, which had been important in supporting the entire economy, was 
diminished.  But China did not start opening up in 1997 or 1998. The suddenness of 
the reversal suggests that there may be other reasons. Moreover, an examination of 
trade data, including service trade and merchandise trade, suggests that Hong Kong‘s 
decline in exports in the period after 1997 was in line with decline in global trade, 
and was actually smaller relative to Korea, Taiwan, the UK, or the US. 
 
This paper offers an alternative explanation to Hong Kong‘s housing market 
downturn during 1998-2003. The hypothesis is that a public housing privatization 
scheme introduced by the government played an important role in reducing existing 
home transactions and home prices. This hypothesis will be substantiated both by 
                                                 
1
 Some commentators cited high real interest rates as the culprit, but the deflation that caused 
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theory and by statistical evidence.  
 
Privatization is often believed to be conducive to economic efficiency. Even 
though this effect is still controversial, any suggestion that privatization could lead to 
the erosion of wealth and economic inefficiency would seem ludicrous to 
economists. 
 
This paper presents evidence that suggests such a possibility. A privatization 
scheme, if managed poorly, could lead to counter-intuitive results. Working through 
the ―housing ladder effect,‖ or otherwise called the equity effect or the down 
payment effect, such as described by Stein (1995), Bardhan, Datta, Edelstein, and 
Kim (2003), Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), Ho & Wong (2009), privatizing public 
housing cheaply could lead to the erosion of equity values among homeowners, 
which could spread throughout the housing market through the housing market 
quality continuum. The erosion of wealth works dynamically, and wipes out any 
static efficiency gains that could result from the privatization. 
 
The housing market is a continuum with a full range of qualities and prices and 
that homeowners trade up to a better quality when they have accumulated sufficient 
equity in their current homes. The ability to trade up depends crucially on the prices 
of existing homes. When prices collapse at the lower end of the market, they transmit 
readily to higher quality homes with a noticeable shrinkage in transaction volumes. I 
hypothesize that the very attractive prices offered by the Housing Authority for 
sitting tenants to buy their own units under the ―Tenants Purchase Scheme,‖ (TPS) 
                                                                                                                                          
high real interest rates did not occur until late 1998, AFTER the major collapse of housing prices. 
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offering up to 88% discount on the estimated market price for buyers making a quick 
decision to buy, made it unattractive for them to buy other kinds of homes. Given 
their earlier documented significant participation in the housing market this 
unavoidably caused home prices to decline.   
 
This paper introduces a new methodology that throws light on the relative 
influence of the public housing privatization program, the Asian Financial Crisis and 
the Financial Tsunami on housing transactions in Hong Kong. I present evidence that 
the housing privatization program also adversely and significantly affected home 
prices—and for a much longer time—by demonstrating that a structural break in the 
housing price relationship occurred at exactly the time the TPS policy took effect. 
 
 Section II presents a review of Hong Kong‘s housing market and the public 
housing privatization program. Section III provides the data description and outlines 
the statistical tests to be conducted. Empirical evidence is presented in Section IV. 
The final section presents the conclusions. 
 
2.  The Public Housing Privatization Program 
 
Economists normally expect that a privatization program would make the 
economy more efficient. The experience in Hong Kong shows that this cannot be 
taken for granted. The circumstances, in which a privatization program is conducted, 
as well as how the privatization takes place, play an important role in determining the 
outcome. 
 
On December 8, 1997, the Housing Authority in Hong Kong announced that 
 10 
sitting tenants in designated public housing estates could buy their own flats at up to 
88% discount off the estimated market price. The move was cheered by the local 
press and thought to engender a large positive wealth effect that would boost 
consumption and give Hong Kong‘s economic growth a big push. However, what 
transpired was a big and immediate economic slump. In the first quarter of 1998, the 
Hong Kong economy declined sharply by an unprecedented 12 per cent on a 
quarter-to-quarter basis (not seasonally adjusted). 
 
The first quarter GDP decline was puzzling not only because of its magnitude 
but also because of the apparent favorable circumstances of the economy at the same 
time. The currency turmoil had shown signs of stabilizing, to the extent that it 
actually allowed one interest rate drop. The HK Policy Research Institute‘s housing 
property confidence index shot up from 35.5 in January to 94.2 in March 1998. The 
Heng Seng index rose 7.4 per cent in the quarter. 
 
What explained this sudden and dramatic reversal amid signs of revival of 
investor confidence? The hypothesis that I advance in this paper, to be tested using 
various statistical tests, is that the public housing privatization scheme actually 
severed the housing ladder that had been in effect for years prior to the 
announcement of the TPS. There was evidence that public housing tenants had been 
important players in the housing market. In a survey in 1992, which was conducted 
by the Housing Authority, it was found that 24 percent of all housing transactions 
were due to public housing tenants and that 13 per cent of all public housing tenants 
already owned at least one residential property. Starting in April 1987, the Housing 
Authority had been implementing a policy to make the richer tenants with at least 10 
 11 
year residence in the public rent housing estate to pay higher rent.
2
 This provided a 
big incentive for the better-off tenants to buy homes as a back-up in the event they 
were asked to pay higher rent. The TPS effectively reversed this policy, for from now 
on rich tenants needed not leave. They were offered an opportunity to capitalize all 
their future rental subsidies through a purchase decision.  
 
As expected, the demand for Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) housing—a 
government subsidized homeownership scheme—suddenly collapsed. HOS housing 
used to attract many public housing tenants to buy. Indeed they were always many 
times oversubscribed ever since the scheme started in 1978. Disappointed buyers 
would have to buy in the open market, where HOS units fetched very high prices, 
reflecting again the strong buying power enjoyed by the richer tenants. Starting in 
June 1997, the Housing Authority allowed HOS owners to resell, after two years 
from their dates of original purchase, their units to public housing tenants and other 
Green Form Applicants without having to repay the land premium. Records of such 
transactions indicate that public housing tenant buyers were paying very high prices 
for these flats, indicating their strong purchasing power.
3
  
                                                 
2
 In essence, the policy requires that tenants who have been accommodated for over ten years be 
subjected to a means test.  If the household income exceeds three times that of the maximum 
eligibility limit, it will have to pay double the standard rent.  Those who have breached stipulated 
income and asset thresholds are required to pay market rent. See ―Safeguarding Rational Allocation of 
Public Housing Resources: A Consultation Document‖ published by the Hong Kong Housing 
Authority in December 1995. 
3
 Transactions with prices were downloadable from the Housing Authority webpage but the 
information is all in Chinese. Starting in 2003 data earlier than 2002 were no longer downloadable. 
However, I had examined the earlier records and found one transaction at 3.95 million Hong Kong 
dollars for a 644 square feet flat in Kowloon in September 1997. This was not an exceptional case in 
1997. Watanabe (1998) provided figures showing that public housing tenants generally saved much 
more than either HOS or private housing owners as well as private housing tenants, particularly in 
1994/95. 
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With the announcement of the TPS, HOS units suddenly lost their appeal, 
because in comparison they were ridiculously expensive. Some 250,000 HOS owners 
suddenly found that their units could hardly find buyers. Immediately they found 
difficulty trading up to better homes in the private housing market. Transactions in 
the existing home market plunged, in turn freezing transactions in the new homes 
market, which at the time almost exclusively depended on buyers trading up (see 
Figure 1). Some commentators argued that the increase in supply of housing, in 
particular, the HOS housing would also produce negative impacts on housing price 
and transaction. In fact, HOS housing is not a new thing to the public and it has long 
been an important part of housing market during the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 2). 
Also, the production of housing excluding the TPS units during 1998-2003 did not 
show an obvious jump as compared to its production during the past 2 decades. On 
the other hand, the TPS units became available overnight. The response to the TPS 
was enthusiastic. While only 19,807 units were sold by the end of March 1999 
(Annual Report 00/01, Hong Kong Housing Authority of HKSAR), many public 
housing tenants were looking forward to the day when they could buy their units. 
 
Since public housing tenants were the primary source of buyers for HOS 
housing, the effect of TPS on HOS housing market was immediate. HOS housing 
owners found that buyers had suddenly disappeared and were no longer able to trade 
up. Similarly, other homeowners who depended on HOS buyers as their principal 
buyers also could not trade up because they also could not find buyers. 
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Figure 1. Total Second Hand Residential Housing Transactions 
(07/1995 - 09/2009 Monthly Data) 
-
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
20,000
9507 9704 9901 0010 02/07 04/04 06/01 07/10 09/07
No. of units
 
Source: Data provided by Research Dept, Centraline Property Agency Ltd. 
 
 
Notwithstanding a highly stimulative budget in 1998 providing generous tax 
relief, generous home starter loans, and an unprecedented tax allowance given to 
homeowners for the mortgage interest payments, the housing market continued to 
fall. By 1999 the Asian Financial Crisis was over. There was no longer any premium 
on Hong Kong dollar‘s forward exchange rates, and real estate prices had risen 
markedly in Singapore.
4
 Hong Kong‘s housing prices, however, continued to decline. 
Even the 10.2 per cent growth in 2000 failed to lift prices, as home prices continued 
to slip by another 14 to 15 per cent. By September 2001 they had fallen back to 
levels reached 10 years ago. By 2003 housing prices generally had lost over 65 per 
cent or more of their 1997 values. 
                                                 
4
 Singapore housing prices fell again subsequent to the bursting of the IT bubble. 
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Figure 2. Completion of Private Residential Units, Subsidized Sale Flats  
and Tenants Purchase Scheme Units, 1980-2008 
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Sources: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, various issues, Censes & Statistics Dept of 
 HKSAR, and Hong Kong Property Review, various years, Rating & Valuation Dept of HKSAR. 
 
 
3.  The Data and Statistical Tests 
 
Two statistical tests provide support to our theory. The first one (the ―effect on 
transactions‖ test) is to show that TPS was the key factor behind the big drop in 
existing home transactions. In a multivariate regression controlling the effects of 
various factors on existing home transactions, the TPS dummy was found to explain 
the decline in home transactions far better than the Asian Financial Crisis. The 
second test (the ―timing test‖) shows that, while exports, mortgage rate and consumer 
price had been the driving factor behind housing prices this relationship showed a 
structural change after 1997. Using the Johansen co-integration model with both an 
intercept and an interactive TPS/exports dummy, I found a structural break at the 
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time of the announcement of the TPS. This suggests that housing probably serve as a 
transmission mechanism between the external (the exports) sector and the domestic 
sector, but this mechanism appears to have been severed by the TPS policy.   
 
In the first test, the focus of analysis is second-hand transaction volume for 
private sector residential properties. This variable is of great interest because 
normally when a homeowner sells his property he would buy another. In contrast, to 
the extent that new housing has already been produced and a new home purchase 
represents only a transfer from the developer‘s inventory to the homebuyer, buying 
an existing home generates more additional economic activities than when a 
household buys a new unit from the developer.
5
   
 
Figure 3.  12-Month Forward Rate Premium/Discount of 
the US Dollar on the HK Dollar  
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Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues, Hong Kong Monetary Authority. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 A ―tree‖ of second hand transactions usually ends up in a first hand high end property. On the 
other hand, if a first time buyer buys a new home the economic stimulation is more limited. 
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Figure 4. Ted Spread - Difference between 3 Month Treasury Bill Rate  
and the 3-Month Eurodollar Rate 
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Source: Data are obtained from Datastream 
 
The housing price of private domestic flats is treated as a variable to explain 
second-hand transactions. The data on this variable is the monthly housing price 
index of private domestic units, which is supplied by the Rating and Valuation 
Department of the Government. The period covered in this study is from July 1995 to 
March 2004.  Second-hand transaction data is not available before July 1995. The 
period covered both the Asian Financial Crisis and the Tenants Purchase Scheme 
(TPS)—the public housing privatization program of the Housing Authority.   
 
Besides, dummy variables are used to capture the effects of key changes in the 
environment, namely the Asian Financial Crisis Dummy (AFC), Global Financial 
Crisis Dummy (GFA) and the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) - as well as a dummy 
to control the first quarter effect of home purchase pattern (FQR) which may affect 
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transaction volume.
6
 During times of acute loss of confidence such as resulting from 
the Asian Financial Crisis, the local currency is subjected to tremendous pressures to 
depreciate. While the spot exchange rate holds its place a considerable discount in 
the value of the local currency appears in the forward market. I therefore find it 
convenient to use the forward market premium of the US dollar over the spot market 
exchange rate as an instrument to measure the degree of the financial crisis (see 
Figure 3.). The Global Financial Crisis in 2008 is proxied by the TED spread - the 
price difference between three-month futures contracts for U.S. Treasuries and 
three-month contracts for Eurodollars (see Figure 4). Yields on US Treasuries can be 
taken as a risk-free rate of return. When banks charge one another for short term 
lending at a higher rate, the premium reflects compensation for perceived risk. An 
important advantage of using such ―non-binary dummies‖ is that there is no need to 
make the necessarily arbitrary judgment as to when the financial crisis is ―switched 
on‖ and when it is ―switched off.‖ In order to facilitate interpretation, I normalize 
these variables to set the maximum value of this dummy within the observation period 
to unity.
7
  
 
Since the TPS was announced by the Hong Kong Housing Authority on 
December 8 1997 we assign the value of ‗0‘ to months prior to December 1997 and 
assigned the value of unity for the months from December 1997 onwards. The policy 
is ―switched off‖ by an announcement made in November 2002. The data for 
mortgage rate is obtained from Hong Kong Monetary Authority. CPI and total 
exports statistics are obtained from officially released statistics. For the list and 
definition of variables that are analyzed, please refer to Table 9.  
                                                 
6
 This effect has to do with the fact that Chinese New Year falls in the first quarter. 
7
 The value of this dummy is therefore 1 at the point of most intensive pressure for the currency 
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4.  Empirical Findings 
 
4.1 The Relative Effects of TPS and the Two Financial Crises on Transactions and 
Prices 
 In this test I attempt to assess the relative impacts of the introduction of the TPS, 
the Asian Financial Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis on second-hand transaction 
volume. The length of the time series allows us to use the Johansen cointegration 
method to test the long term relationships of the key variables. The dependent 
variable for the first test is the logarithm (log) of the second-hand home transaction 
volume (LTRAN). The explanatory variables include the log of the housing price 
index (LPPI), mortgage rate (MR), the Asian financial crisis dummy (AFC), Global 
financial crisis dummy (GFC), and binary dummy variables TPS (unity from 
1997:12, 0 prior to this
8
), and FQR (1 for first 3 months every year). It is expected 
that any increase in housing prices will allow homeowners to trade theirs for better 
ones and thus tends to drive up transactions. On the other hand an increase in interest 
rates will dampen transactions because this will increase the costs of owning a new 
home or a better home. 
 
 I begin the analysis by examining the stationarity properties of the variables 
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981). The 
optimal lag in the test is chosen by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Table 4.1 
shows that the test statistics for all the series in level form and in their first 
differences, respectively. The null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected when the 
series are in level but can be rejected when the series are in first differences, showing 
                                                                                                                                          
to devalue and 0 when there were no such pressures.  
8
 In November 2002 the Government announced a plan to terminate the TPS, but termination 
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that all the series are integrated of order one.  
 
Table 4.1  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Unit Root (Period: 1995M7 to 
2009M11 ) 
Variable name Test on No Trend Trend Conclusion 
LnTRAN 
 
Level 
1st diff 
-0.8498 
-12.1277*** 
-2.9550 
-12.0611*** 
I(1) 
 
 
LnLPPI Level 
1st diff 
-1.4716 
-4.3952*** 
-1.1844 
-4.4779*** 
I(1) 
 
 
MR Level 
1st diff 
-1.1855 
-6.6066*** 
     -1.5717 
-6.5854*** 
I(1) 
Note: 1. 5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests that include  constant; and constant  
   plus trend = 2.87 and -3.43 respectively.  
 2. The numbers of lags in the two unit root tests are determined by the AIC.   
 3. *** indicate 1% significance levels. 
 
Since the variables are integrated of the same order I(1), I can use the 
well-known Johansen and Juselius procedure (1990). Under this procedure, I first 
identify the long-run relationship among LTRAN, LPPI, and MR. Following the 
common practice, the dummy variables AFC, GFC, TPS and FQR are all treated as 
exogenous I(0) variables in the VAR and the error-correction model.  
 
The co-integration test results are presented in the Table 4.2. The number of 
co-integrating vectors r is determined by reference to the λmax and trace statistics. 
The lag specification for the Johansen test is determined by Akaike‘s Information 
Criterion (AIC). The results show that TRAN, LPPI and MR are cointegrated with 
only one cointegrating vector. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
was not effective until after 2004, when the last batch of TPS units were sold. 
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Table 4.2 Testing Cointegration Using the Johansen Procedure 
Cointegrating 
Relation 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Test 
Statistics 
Probability 
TRAN 
= f (LPPI, MR) 
With exogenous dummy 
variables AFC, GFC, TPS and 
FQR 
 
None  
At most 1 
Trace Value 
    104.30*** 
     10.40 
 
 
0.0000 
0.2513 
 
  λ max Value  
 None  
At most 1 
     93.91*** 
      9.45 
0.0000 
0.2500 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1% level.  
 
 
Table 4.3  Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients Using the Johansen 
Procedure 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic 
LTRAN 
LPPI 
MR 
1 
-1.0035 
0.0153 
 
-7.3766*** 
1.3543 
Note: *** denote 1% significant level  
 
 Table 4.3 reports the normalized cointegrating coefficients that will be 
interpreted as long run equilibrium coefficients. Coefficients on both LPPI and MR 
are shown with the expected signs. In general, price appreciation provides an 
incentive and a greater ability for homeowners to trade up, thus pushing up second 
hand transaction. The interest rate, on the other hand, discourages home purchases 
and tends to dampen transactions. In addition, given that the variables are 
cointegrated, I then estimate the error correction model as shown in Table 4.4. The 
ECM coefficient enters significantly with negative sign. The significant negative 
ECM coefficient confirms our earlier findings that cointegration exists between them.  
It is noteworthy that the dampening effect of the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS 
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dummy) is greater than that of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC dummy) and Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC dummy). Also it is statistically much more significant. (See 
Table 4.4 coefficients of the TPS, AFC and GFC dummy). Because both the TPS 
dummy and the two financial crisis dummies have values between 0 and 1 their 
coefficients can be directly compared with each other. We can see that the effect of 
the TPS on second hand transition (coefficient= -0.1348, t=-3.11) is much bigger 
than the Asian financial crisis dummy which even does not show a significant 
coefficient (coefficient= -0.0519, t=-0.55). The Global financial crisis in 2008 shows 
a strongest negative impact on second hand transaction. While if we compare the 
effects of the two financial crises and TPS on housing price, the Asian financial crisis 
had produced the largest negative impact. To sum up, TPS had a larger impact on 
transaction than on price compared to that of the Asian financial crisis. This is in line 
with my argument that after the announcement of TPS, HOS units suddenly lost a lot 
of potential housing buyer and so they found immediately difficulty trading up to 
better homes in the private housing market. Transactions in the overall second home 
market and even first hand market therefore would be remained at a low level for 
longer period.  
 
 Figure 5 shows the residuals from long run cointegrating relation among 
LTRAN, LPPI and MR which is mean-reverting over the long run. It is worthy to 
note that the second hand transaction had dropped dramatically for several months 
both after the outbreak each of two financial crises. Nevertheless, we can see that the 
second hand transaction had shown a quick and strong rebound after the Global 
financial crisis while the transaction had remained below the long run equilibrium 
level for over 5 years after the Asian financial crisis. In view of the different housing 
market reactions to the financial crises, obviously, the 1998-2003 experience could 
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not be purely explained by the Asian financial crisis and the TPS should play an 
important role for explaining the housing market downturn during that period. Note 
that over an extended period after the TPS announcement in December 1997 the 
residuals remained negative. This is quite unusual. Transactions did not come back to 
normal levels until shortly after the announcement of the termination of the TPS 
policy in November 2002. 
 
Table 4.4  Error Correction Model 
Regressors ΔTRAN ΔLPPI 
ΔTRAN(-1) -0.1213(-1.64)* 0.0133(1.43) 
ΔTRAN(-2) -0.0615(-0.87) -0.0127(-1.43) 
ΔLPPI(-1) 4.1747(6.47)*** 0.2463(3.04)** 
ΔLPPI(-2) 1.4070(2.06)** -0.2262(-2.63)** 
ΔMR(-1) -0.1069(-1.23) -0.0104(-0.95) 
ΔMR(-2) -0.0079(-0.09) -0.0017(-0.16) 
Constant 0.0828(3.48)*** 0.0050(1.66)* 
TPS -0.1348(-3.11)*** -0.0107(-1.97)** 
AFC -0.0519(-0.55) -0.0471(-3.97)*** 
GFC -0.2904(-2.87)** -0.0196(-1.54) 
FQR -0.0859(-2.47)** -0.0107(-1.97)** 
ECMt-1 -0.5972(-7.84)*** 0.0293(3.06)*** 
R-squared:  0.4188 0.4824 
Note: 1. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively.  
 2. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics  
 3. Optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion 
 
 Even though the dummies variables in Table 4.4 indicates that TPS had lesser 
direct impact on price compared to that of the Asian Financial dummy, however, if 
there exists a positive relation between LnTRAN and LnPPI, I can still conclude that 
TPS had indirectly pushed down the housing price through its impact on reducing 
existing home transaction. Leung, Lau and Leong (2002) found that there is a robust 
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positive correlation between price and volume while there is no clear causal relation. 
The vector error correction model (VECM) is also appropriate for examining their 
long run causal relationships. The coefficients of the error correction terms (ECM) 
and their t-statistics are shown in Table 4.4. The ECM coefficients turn out to be 
significant with positive sign when LnPPI is treated as dependent variable which 
indicates that there is a positive relation between LnPPI and LnTRAN. Given that 
both ECM coefficients are significant when either LnPPI or LnTRAN is treated as 
dependent variable, I can conclude that there exists a bi-directional positive causality 
between second hand transaction and property price. 
 
Figure 5: Residuals from the Long Run Cointegrating Relation 
for LTRAN, LPPI and MR 
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4.2  Structural Break and Simulation of Housing Price 
As explained above, we would expect that a structural change had occurred in 
the first quarter of 1998, since the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) that allowed 
sitting tenants to buy their units at deep discounts was announced on 8 December 
1997. I use a timing test to determine whether a structural change indeed took place 
right after the announcement of the policy. In this test I identify the timing and the 
magnitude of a structural break in the housing price equation. The housing price 
equation is based on the assumption that the housing market was essentially in 
equilibrium over the test period. When the housing market was in equilibrium, 
housing prices reflect the bids from buyers which increase when their incomes rise.  
I write a housing price equation with three explanatory variables: exports of goods 
and services which represents the key exogenous determinant of incomes for a small 
open economy, mortgage rates and consumer price.   
 
Following Pinon-Farah (1998), and Bardhan et. al. (2003), the significance of 
the key t statistic in the relevant test testifies to the existence of a structural change. 
For this purpose, I now incorporate a ―timing test switching dummy variable‖(Dum) 
into the model (all values being equal to zero prior quarter Q and switching to unity 
for all quarters from Q is incorporated in our system. Under this test, I switch the 
dummy variable (we can call this a regime shift dummy if the timing is proven 
correct) from zero to unity in different quarters, and observe the changes in the 
coefficients estimates and the t statistics. The intercept dummy variable ―Dum‖ 
would capture any shift in the relationship.  
 
Two kinds of dummy variables—one for the intercept and one ―interactive 
dummy‖—are used to capture any shift and change in the magnitudes of key 
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coefficients in the relationship. I found that a structural break occurred in the first 
quarter of 1998. Interestingly, this coincides with our priors, since the Tenants 
Purchase Scheme—which I have reasoned will have significant structural changes on 
the housing market, was announced on December 8 1997. 
 
Table 5.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Unit Root (Period: 1981Q1 to 
2009Q3) 
Variable name Test on No Trend Trend Conclusion 
LnPPI 
 
Level 
1st diff 
-1.2199 
-6.4370*** 
-1.4714 
-6.4301*** 
I(1) 
 
MR Level 
1st diff 
-1.9481 
-3.4775*** 
-2.9910 
-3.5392** 
I(1) 
 
LnEX 
 
Level 
1st diff 
-1.9732 
-4.5706*** 
-0.8138 
-4.9606*** 
I(1) 
 
LnCPI Level 
1st diff 
-0.5238 
-2.7463* 
     -1.6929 
-1.7524 
I(1) 
Note: 1. 5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests that include  constant; and constant      
   plus trend = 2.88 and -3.45 respectively.  
 2. The numbers of lags in the two unit root tests are determined by the AIC.   
 3. *** indicate 1% significance levels. 
 
The ADF test results show that the null hypothesis of the relationship containing 
a unit root can only be rejected when the series are first differenced.  Thus the series 
are all integrated of order one I(1) (see Table 5.1). Since the variables are integrated 
of the same order I(1), I then employ the Johansen and Juselius procedure (1990). 
The lag length of the VAR is determined by Akaike‘s Information Criterion (AIC). 
As is standard, both the slope and the intercept dummy variables are treated as 
exogenous I(0) variables in the co-integrating equation and the error correction 
model.  
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Table 5.2 
Testing Cointegration between LnPPI, LnEx MR and LnCPI Using the 
Johansen Procedure with Dummy Variables, 1980Q1 to 2009Q3 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
Test 
Statistics 
LnPPI = f (LnEx, MR, 
LnCPI) 
Trace tests: 
r = 0 
r≦1 
 
λ max tests: 
r = 0 
r = 1 
 
r > 0 
r > 1 
 
 
r = 1 
r = 2 
Trace Value 
99.33*** 
25.46 
 
λ max Value 
73.87*** 
15.00 
Notes:   1. *** denotes significance at 1% level    
  2. r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. 
  3. VAR = 2 is determined by AIC criterion 
 
 
Table 5.3  
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients Using the Johansen Procedure 
Cointegrating equation: 
LnPPI = f (LnEX, MR, LnCPI) 
Coefficient t-statistic 
LnPPI 1.0000  
LnEx -0.2220 -1.0416 
MR 0.0861 4.2026*** 
LnCPI -1.4860 -3.8454*** 
Notes:  1. ** and * denote significance at 5% and 10% level respectively. 
  2. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion. 
  3. D98 and interactive dummies are treated as exogenous I(0) variables in the   
        cointegrating equation. 
 
The cointegration test results for the model incorporating the most significant 
dummy variables—switching to unity in the first quarter of 1998—are presented in 
Table 5.2 through Table 5.5. Table 5.2 presents evidence that LnPPI is cointegrated 
with the LnEX, MR and LnCPI. Table 5.3 shows that the normalized cointegrating 
coefficients on LnCPI and MR carry the expected signs and are statistically 
significant. The error correction model, reported in Table 5.4, showing a statistically 
significant negative coefficient on the ECM term, confirms the earlier findings that 
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cointegration exists between the variables.   
 
Table 5.5 shows that the key coefficients and t statistics for models with 
dummies switched on in different quarters. Readers can testify that there is an 
obvious jump in the t statistic when the switch occurred in 98Q1 rather than 97Q4. 
Since TPS was announced on December 8 this result is just right. The negative 
coefficient on the interactive term for exports shows that exports growth no longer 
provided the housing market the kind of support it used to; the positive coefficient on 
the interactive term for the interest rate and consumer price show that a decline in 
interest rates and increase in inflation would not provide much stimulation either. 
 
Table 5.4  Error Correction Representation of Johansen Model 
(Dependent variable:ΔLnPPIt) 
Regressors Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept 0.0087 (1.0519) 
ΔLnPPIt-1 0.2875 (3.2681)*** 
ΔLnEXt-1 -0.1430 (-1.0225) 
ΔMRt-1 -0.0016 (-0.3104) 
ΔLnCPIt-1 1.4217 (2.2867)** 
ECMt-1 -0.0476 (-3.328)*** 
LnEX * D98Q1 -0.6473 (-1.9818)** 
MR*D98Q1 0.0169 (1.1147) 
LnCPI * D98Q1 -1.8558 (-1.2015) 
D98Q1 
R-squared: 0.4137 
16.9556 (1.5736) 
Note: 1. Optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion.  
 2. * , ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively   
 3. Δdenotes first difference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
Table 5.5   
A Timing Test by Switching Dummy Variables to Unity in Different Quarters 
Quarter with Value of 
Dummy Switched  
to Unity 
LnEX * DQ MR * DQ LnCPI*DQ Intercept 
Dummy DQ 
1997 Q2 -0.5366 
(-1.6951) 
0.0127 
(0.8137) 
-1.2146 
(-0.7161) 
12.5513 
(1.1140) 
1997 Q3 -0.5632 
(-1.6437) 
0.1144 
(0.8120) 
-1.4568 
(0.7168) 
14.0150 
(1.0615) 
1998 Q1 -0.6474 
(-1.9818)** 
0.0169 
(1.1147) 
-1.8556 
(-1.2015) 
16.9556 
(1.5736) 
1998 Q2 -0.6061 
(-1.8533)* 
0.0156 
(1.0368) 
-1.5447 
(-1.0100) 
14.9773 
(1.3966) 
1998 Q3 -0.3134 
(-0.8588) 
0.0050 
(0.3193) 
0.1277 
(0.0761) 
3.4326 
(0.2859) 
Note: Figures are estimated coefficients for the error correction models. t-statistics are in brackets. DQ 
is a dummy variable that switches to unity in the quarter on the left column. The t statistics indicates a 
structural break in 1998:Q1. The TPS was announced on December 8 1997.   
 
As Table 5.5 shows that Dum is indeed largest and statistically most significant 
when Dum=Dum98Q1, i.e., when it is switched to unity in the first quarter of 1998, 
suggesting a possible structural shift in 1998 Q1. It is noteworthy that Bardhan et. 
al.(2003), using a similar methodology, found no evidence that the Asian financial 
crisis(AFC) had produced a structural shift in Singapore, as all timing test switch 
dummy variables regardless of the quarter they are switched to unity(from 1997Q2 
up to 1998Q1) were insignificant. This lends support to our argument that the 
structural shift we found in Hong Kong is mainly attributed to the policy change – 
viz. the TPS and not the AFC.  
 
To further confirm the presence of a structural break in the first quarter of 1998 
I conducted a Chow Test. To do this I first re-estimate the relation using the 
sub-sample data before and then after(and inclusive of) the first quarter of 1998. I 
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report two test statistics for the Chow Forecast test. Both the F-statistic (1.6760 with 
p-value of 0.029) and log likelihood ratio (94.52 with p-value of 0.0000) rejected the 
null hypothesis of no structural change in the equation before and after 1998Q1. 
Therefore, I conclude that both the timing test and Chow Test provide strong support 
for the hypothesis that the Tenants Purchase Scheme produced a ―regime shift‖ that 
affected the housing price relationship. 
 
Figure 6 
Predicted Log of Property Price Using JH Model Incorporating Dummy 
Variables Switched to Unity from 1998:quarter 1. (1998Q1-2009Q3) 
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 To conclude, I found a structural break that occurred in the first quarter of 1998, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that TPS caused the structural break. The 
stimulative effects of exports on Hong Kong‘s housing prices were reduced 
significantly from the first quarter of 1998. 
 
Forecast Period: 98Q1-09Q3 
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Based on the estimated error correction model reported in Table 5.4, I conduct a 
dynamic forecast starting from 1998Q1 to 2009Q3. The forecasted values of LnPPI 
are based on previous predicted values given the actual exports, consumer price and 
mortgage rate. I have plotted the predicted values against the actual ones in the 
Figure 6. Even the period of forecast values are over ten years, surprisingly, the 
model tracks the actual data very well indeed. It would be interesting to find out what 
might have happened to Hong Kong‘s economy if there had been no Tenants 
Purchase Scheme. To do so, I set the dummy D98Q1 equals to zero, we can see that 
the property price should be bottomed out in year 2000 instead of experiencing a 
over seven year property downturn.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Our empirical findings have shown that residential property price, mortgage 
rates, the Asian Financial Crisis, and the implementation of the Tenants Purchase 
Scheme are important determinants of the second-hand home transaction volume. 
Price appreciation allows existing homeowners to trade up for better homes and 
boosts confidence. Mortgage rate increases are found to have clearly dampening 
effects on housing market transactions. Of particular interest is the finding that the 
Tenants Purchase Scheme is found to have a significant and a greater negative effect 
on the housing transactions than the Asian Financial Crisis.  
 
During the mid-1990s, Hong Kong house prices appreciated rapidly as funds 
poured in from among the richer public housing tenants. After the Asian Financial 
Crisis, housing transactions had eased and house prices had slipped. At the eve of the 
announcement of the TPS on 8 December 1997, home transactions in Dec 
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unexpectedly plunged to new lows, and home prices began their dramatic downturn 
(see Table 6). 
 
Table 6  Monthly Transactions of Private Homes 
 Year/Month   First Hand Homes   Second Hand Homes  
    
 97/07  2,147 17,227 
 97/08  2,044 8,595 
 97/09  1,396 7,800 
 97/10  2,174 8,315 
 97/11  1,343 8,653 
 97/12  364 3,804 
 97/01-97/12  20,380 133,555 
 98/01  2,334 3,598 
 98/02  868 2,883 
 98/03  2,636 5,501 
 98/04  649 4,683 
 98/05  2,429 4,364 
 98/06  3,871 3,413 
 98/07  1,880 3,337 
 98/01-98/12  31,599 48,110 
 99/01  1,999 5,012 
 99/07  1,394 4,317 
 9901-9912  21,557 46,565 
 00/01  695 4,000 
 00/07  2,400 2,929 
 00/01-00/12  17,830 39,089 
Source: Data provided by Centaline Property Agency Ltd. 
 
Notwithstanding Hong Kong‘s rapid economic growth in 2000 at 10.2 per cent 
home prices continued to fall, losing over 14 per cent in the year. My theory is that 
this has to do with the immobilization of the existing homeowners as a result of TPS. 
Because land developers from now on could only depend on first-time buyers to buy 
their homes, they needed to keep reducing their asking prices in order to reach 
potential buyers with a lower purchasing power. This inevitably worsened the 
negative equity problem, both by dragging more homeowners into the trap and 
deepening the trap. Given the huge linkage effect on the economy of the housing 
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market (Case, 2000), governments pondering privatization schemes need to learn 
from the experience in Hong Kong.  
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Table 7.  List of Variables and their Definitions 
 
Short Form 
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
Sources and Definition of 
Variables 
 
TRAN Second hand home 
transaction volume 
(dependent variable) 
Monthly volume figures are no. of 
registration of transactions in 
private residential properties in the 
second hand market and provided 
by Centaline Ltd. 
PPI Property Price Index 
1989=100 
Property price index 
AFC Asian Financial Crisis 
Dummy 
This is a non-binary dummy 
variable derived from the 12-month 
forward rate premium of the US 
dollar on the HK dollar.  It is 
normalized to have a maximum 
value of unity . 
GFC Global Financial Crisis 
Dummy 
This is a non-binary dummy 
variable derived from 3 month 
Treasury bill rate and the 3-month 
Eurodollar rate  It is normalized to 
have a maximum value of unity . 
TPS Tenants Purchase Scheme 1 starting from the announcement of 
the scheme in December 1997, 0 
before that month (Monthly Data). 
D98Q1 Dummy Variable 1 starting from the 1998 1
st
 quarter, 
0 before that quarter (Quarterly 
Data) 
FQR First Quarter Effect 1 for months in the first quarter of 
the year, 0 otherwise 
MR Mortgage Rate(%) Prime rate plus 0.5% prior to 1997. 
Starting from 1997 Jan, weighted 
average mortgage rate from 1997 to 
2009 was provided by Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority. 
EX Total Exports of Goods and 
Services 
In million HKD (current price), 
seasonally adjusted 
DQ Timing Test Dummy 1 starting from the quarter tested, 0 
prior to that quarter 
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III.  ESSAY TWO  
 
 
The Nexus between Housing and the Macro Economy:  
The Hong Kong Case 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Expenditures on housing represent the single largest item of expenditures 
for most households in any economy and a purchase that normally requires financing.  
It is widely believed that housing plays an important role in the macroeconomy (Case, 
2000, Goodhart and Hofmann, 2003, Cutler, 2005, Leung, 2004, Gerlach and Peng, 
2005). The US subprime crisis and financial tsunami, in fact, are an outcome of the 
fall in US housing price and so understanding the relation between housing market 
and ―domestic consumption and investment‖ is of particular importance nowadays. 
This paper considers this subject from the perspective of economic base theory and 
presents some evidence for this relationship, focusing on the Hong Kong case. 
 
 Hong Kong presents a very interesting case for our investigation of the 
relation between the housing market and the macro economy, both because it is a 
small open economy and because it is rated as the world‘s freest economy. In 2010 
Hong Kong has been the number 1 free economy in the world for the 15th 
consecutive year according to the Heritage Foundation. It is known to be a very 
dynamic economy, with a big population living in a small area, so that housing 
represents a significant and rapidly growing component of wealth for its homeowners. 
Yet shortly after the Asian Financial Crisis, the Hong Kong economy shrank by 5.5 
per cent in 1998. In Hong Kong‘s history negative economic growth for the entire 
year is unprecedented. With many economies around the world still enjoying and 
apparently benefiting from a housing boom, there is a need for greater understanding 
of the relation between housing and the macro economy.  
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Table 1.  Private Consumption during Two Crises 
 
Asian Financial Crisis  
 
Global Financial Tsunami  
Quarter  HK$ 
million  
% 
Change 
(year on 
year) 
Quarter HK$ 
million 
% 
Change 
(year on 
year) 
97 Q4 205,555 2.3 08 Q3 252,033 0.7  
98 Q1 184,847 -1.9 08 Q4 256,996 -3.2  
98 Q2 186,143 -4.0 09 Q1 238,438 -6.2  
98 Q3 184,073 -8.2 09 Q2 257,936 -0.6  
98 Q4 189,678 -7.7 09 Q3 253,433 0.6  
99 Q1 177,669 -3.9 09 Q4 269,261 4.8  
99 Q2 188,476 1.3 10 Q1 253,886 6.5  
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, Census & Statistics Dept of HKSAR, various 
years. 
 
Table 2.  Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation during Two Crises 
 
Asian Financial Crisis  
 
Global Financial Tsunami  
Quarter  HK$ 
million  
% 
Change 
(year on 
year) 
Quarter HK$ 
million 
% 
Change 
(year on 
year) 
98 Q1 80,864  -1.0  08 Q3 85,871 4.1  
98 Q2 87,439  1.9  08 Q4 74,029 -16.7  
98 Q3 74,339  -11.7  09 Q1 76,948 -10.3  
98 Q4 73,756  -18.8  09 Q2 78,012 -11.8  
99 Q1 65,774  -18.7  09 Q3 88,585 3.2  
99 Q2 66,085  -24.4  99 Q4 84,470 14.1  
99 Q3 65,536  -11.8  10 Q1 85,054 10.5  
99 Q4 65,993  -10.5     
00 Q1 66,809  1.6     
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, Census & Statistics Dept of HKSAR, various 
years. 
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As mentioned in the first paper, the Hong Kong economy had suffered under 
both the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Global Financial Tsunami in 2008. In 
the exports sector and stock market which are both more sensitive to external shocks, 
Hong Kong‘s exports and stock market fell much more in the wake of the global 
financial tsunami. However, the declines in domestic sector including private 
consumption and gross investment had lessened in 2008 financial tsunami and the 
rebounds have appeared to be much stronger after the crisis (see Table 1 and 2). I 
argued that a much better performance in property market in 2008/09 should play a 
significant role in making the domestic sector more stable and enhancing the 
rebounds.  
 
In comparing the performance of domestic sectors under the two crises, there 
are some interesting questions that deserve study. What accounts for the strength in 
the Hong Kong housing market ahead of 1997, and what accounts for the major 
decline after? If recessions would cause a fall in property market, why we did not see 
a more dramatic drop in property price in 2008 crisis? Does it imply that the housing 
market should drive domestic private expenditures (defined as domestic private 
consumption plus domestic fixed capital formation)? Or do domestic private 
expenditures drive housing prices? What are the causal directions? I will attempt to 
answer these questions, presenting statistical evidence to support my arguments. 
 
Many commentators attributed the housing price surge ahead of the handover of 
sovereignty to a provision in the Annex to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which 
restricted the annual land grant to no more than 50 hectares (excluding land granted 
to the Hong Kong Housing Authority for the construction of public rental housing) 
unless a relaxation to the limit is approved by the Land Commission consisting of 
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equal number of members from the British and Chinese sides
9
 (Peng & Wheaton, 
1994). Yet a comparison of the number of households and the number of dwelling 
units indicates that the housing market was essentially in balance during the run-up 
to the handover: housing prices appeared to be rising in a moving equilibrium—with 
supply and demand being equalized even as price change. This is much like the 
rising wages and salaries witnessed in a growing economy. 
 
2. Theory 
 
I will follow the tradition of viewing a small open economy as comprising a 
basic sector that is trade-oriented, and a non-basic sector that owes its existence to 
and services the basic sector. A small open economy has to export in order to finance 
its imports, which are necessary for its survival. The exports sector, then, is the 
driver of the economy, while the ―non-basic‖ or domestic sector spins off economic 
benefits throughout the economy. It is, however, typical that the basic sector can only 
provide a limited number of employment opportunities. The majority of workers 
have to work in the non-basic sector. Thus, earnings from the basic sector must be 
spent in the economy in order to create additional jobs. Housing happens to be the 
largest single item of expenditures that employers and employees in the basic sector 
can spend on. What is more important, housing as an industry also has much greater 
domestic value added content than many other industries. Even though modern 
housing construction may rely increasingly on imported prefabricated components 
the construction has to take place on a plot of land. It is largely through the building 
                                                 
9
 See http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~pchksar/JD/jd-full1.htm  In practice Hong Kong had released more 
than 50 hectares per year every year since the Sino-British Joint Declaration took effect in 1984. 
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erected on a plot of land that the latter can realize its locational rent. In a sense, then 
it is housing that confers a plot of land its rent. When housing prices rise, small and 
medium businesses will also become better able to obtain loans to finance their 
business operations (Chen, 2001). Thus it is postulated that for a small open 
economy housing serves as the principal transmission mechanism and the linkage 
between the basic sector and the non-basic sector, or perhaps more accurately 
between the basic sector and the rest of non-basic sector other than housing, since 
housing is certainly an important component in the non-basic sector. It is, of course, 
also possible that instead of, or in addition to trade, capital inflows, particularly FDI, 
may also provide the non-basic sector the ―fuel‖ for growth, even though much of 
FDI may target at the exports markets
10
. But these capital inflows would also benefit 
the housing sector before it benefits the rest of the non-basic sector. 
 
In comparison, for a large, relatively closed economy the role of housing is 
expected to be smaller. There is hardly a distinction between the basic sector and the 
non-basic sector, as the economy is relatively self-sufficient. In addition to housing, 
there are also many other forms of assets that can serve as a store of value for income 
earners—with the result that housing becomes relatively less important. 
 
Under this hypothesis, the run-up in housing prices in Hong Kong before 1997 
is very much a result of strong exports, although it is also pushed up by speculative 
activities and by a deliberate policy to drive out richer public housing tenants onto 
the private market. Following the Asian Financial Crisis, Hong Kong‘s exports 
suffered a decline. According to the same logic as described this would have led to a 
                                                 
10
 Chou and Wong (2002) found that trade and foreign direct investment effects account for 
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decline in housing prices any way. But the decline has been further aggravated by 
two other policies: a policy to lure sitting tenants, including the richer ones, to buy 
their own units rather than from the private market, which severed the ―housing 
ladder‖ of households trading up to better and more costly homes, and a policy to 
increase housing supply to a target of 85,000 units a year. This part‘s focus is 
however NOT about this story, but about the effects of the housing market collapse 
on the macro economy, and about the macroeconomic effect of exports growth on 
housing prices in a small open economy.  
 
In this paper, I hypothesize that housing plays the unique role of a bridge 
between the basic sector and the non-basic sector. In particular, I hypothesize that 
exports, apart from providing employment and incomes, will push up housing prices. 
As housing prices move up, a range of other activities will benefit. Expenditures on 
housing represent the single largest item of expenditures for most households in any 
economy. Expenditures on housing purchases, in particular, amount to many years of 
income. That is why financing is very important. Few individuals or households 
would commit years of incomes to servicing the loan for acquiring any asset other 
than housing. Because of the leverage involved, capital gains from housing 
potentially generate sizable returns to the initial investment. On the basis of such 
capital gains, an entrepreneur can usually refinance the home and obtain a much 
larger loan to support his business project. So residential housing also indirectly 
allows many potential entrepreneurs realize their dreams. Increases in house prices 
enhance the collateral available to homeowners in form of equity withdrawal by 
remortgage their unit and thereby facilitating higher consumption or investment 
                                                                                                                                          
approximately 44% of the growth in Hong Kong. 
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(Aoki et al., 2001)  
 
Yet the view that housing prices would boost consumption and domestic 
demand has not been unchallenged. For example, it is argued that heavier mortgage 
payments resulting from higher housing prices may displace consumption 
expenditures (Glaeser, 2000). Miles (1994) argues that increases in house price 
would hurt those existing owners who want to trade up and also the first time buyers 
(existing renters) as increase in home prices would lead to increase their saving for 
down payment and thereby reducing their consumption. (Campbell and Cocco, 2007). 
Therefore, the positive wealth effect on consumption could be offset by increase in 
saving by those owners who want to trade up and first time buyers.  
 
In Hong Kong, 53.1% of total number of domestic households in 2010 own 
their homes (including private housing, subsidized sales flats and TPS units), and this 
figure has remained very stable from 1999 to 2010—representing a change from the 
previous increasing trend, and the household formation is around 30,000 each year 
sharing just about 1 % of the total number of households in Hong Kong (General 
Household Survey, various years, Censes & Statistics Dept of HKSAR). Also, 30.1% 
of households who reside in public rental housing receiving heavy subsidy form the 
government are not affected by the increase in housing price. Only 13.1% of 
households are tenants of private housing. The net impacts on domestic demand 
arising from the wealth effect and saving effect from renters as a result of the 
increase in housing price remains an empirical question and the results would vary 
across countries with different demographic profiles, saving and consumption 
patterns. 
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An important and extremely robust result of the current paper is that domestic 
private sector expenditures is always driven by the housing price index and not vice 
versa. The dramatic decline in housing prices appears to be a major reason behind the 
sharp decline of the economy and the deflation that began in August 1998(cf. Cutler, 
2005). 
 
Section 2 will provide some background to the Hong Kong housing market and 
highlight some key policy changes that happened in the 1990s. Section 3 will present 
the results of empirical tests under a VAR framework. I identified two cointegrating 
relations among the variables Housing Price Index(LnPPI), Total Exports(LnEX), 
Mortgage Rate(MR), and Private Domestic Demand(LnDD),and found that 
restrictions consistent with our prior assumptions cannot be rejected. Variance 
decomposition and impulse response functions indicate that indeed exports is the key 
driving variable for housing price, while housing price is the key driving variable for 
private domestic demand. Section 4 will provide the conclusions. 
 
2. Hong Kong‟s Housing Market and Policies 
 
Public housing has traditionally played a key role in Hong Kong‘s housing 
market. To deal with the rapidly expanding population, Governor MacLehose 
announced in October 1972 an unprecedented public housing programme.  
Seventy-two public housing estates were to be constructed, to provide decent 
housing to a total of 1.8 million people. These estates offered cheap rents to qualified 
means-tested households. Then in 1978, the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) was 
launched, offering an opportunity for those who were not qualified for low cost 
rental housing to buy their own flats at prices much lower than private flats. Most 
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buyers of HOS housing were public rental tenants, who were given a more favorable 
quota than other eligible buyers over the limited supply of new HOS flats. 
 
Hong Kong‘s housing prices slumped following the dramatic interest rate spike 
of 1980-81 and in the face of political uncertainty over Hong Kong‘s future. With the 
signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 removing much of the political 
uncertainty, Hong Kong‘s housing prices began to climb spectacularly. Particularly 
after 1987, following the implementation of a policy to make the richer public 
housing tenants pay higher rent, participation among public housing tenants in the 
housing market rose. A priori, one would predict that this inflow of cash into the 
housing market would drive housing prices as well as housing transactions up.  By 
1992/93, it was found that 13 per cent of public housing tenants owned a flat and as 
much as 24 per cent of housing transactions were due to purchase by public housing 
tenants(Hong Kong Housing Authority,1993).   
 
With housing prices surging ahead, a Task Force on Land Supply and Property 
Prices was set up in 1994. Finding that 10% of sale and purchase agreements 
presented for stamping between February 1992 and March 1994 involved short-term 
re-sales—which was considered prima facie evidence for speculative activities, the 
Task Force recommended a series of anti-speculation measures in June. Among such 
measures, the initial deposit was to be fixed at 10% of the purchase price and 5% 
would be forfeited if the purchaser fails to sign the formal sale and purchase 
agreement or enters into a Cancellation Agreement with the developer. Stamp duties 
were also made payable at the time a provisional sale and purchase agreement was 
signed and not at the time the transaction was completed.   
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Apart from worrying about speculation, the government also had worried over 
the homeownership rate. In 1987, The Long Term Housing Strategy: A Policy 
Statement already made it clear that the government wanted to encourage home 
ownership. The Tenants Purchase Scheme(TPS), announced in December 1997, was 
a way to boost the homeownership rate. Offering tenants as much as 88 % off the 
estimated market values and allowing them to resell after two years, the TPS was 
attractive and was to play a strategic role in Mr. Tung Chee-hwa‘s vision of 
increasing homeownership from 50% to 70% in ten years, as announced in his first 
policy address of October 1997.   
 
Unfortunately, the scheme‘s success meant a sudden loss of attractiveness of 
Home Ownership Scheme flats, which suddenly looked ridiculously expensive in 
comparison
11
. For the first time ever, HOS homeowners found a dearth of buyers.  
Turnover in the second-hand market dropped precipitously, and developers had to 
by-pass existing homeowners in order to find buyers (Ho, et.al. 2005). After they 
have exhausted one ―crop‖ of buyers, they must further cut prices in order to reach 
buyers with lower purchasing power.  
 
In an attempt to boost homeownership Mr.Tung in 1997 announced a new 
policy of increasing the supply of homes to 85000 units a year (from an average of 
about 53,000 units a year over the 1987-1997 period). From 1998 on through late 
                                                 
11
 For this hypothesis to carry weight, public housing tenants have to be active in the housing market 
prior to the announcement of the TPS.  This was vindicated as a survey by the Housing Authority in 
1992/93 found that public housing tenants were responsible for 24 per cent of housing transactions.  
Watanabe(1998) found public housing tenants had huge savings compared to private housing tenants 
or owners. 
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1999 the government used every means within its control to boost housing supply
12
.  
The increased supply began to hit the market around late 2000. In late 2002, in order 
to stabilize the housing market, new measures were implemented including cessation 
of the production and sale of HOS, PSPS flats as well as the sale of PRH flats under 
the TPS after phase 6 will cease from 2003 onwards 
 
4. Housing Price Determination in a Small Open Economy and the Exports 
Multiplier on Domestic Economy 
 
4.1  Economic Base Theory 
In principle, many factors determine housing prices, and they include both 
demand side and supply side factors. These factors include demographic variables, 
incomes, interest rates, mortgage loan ratios, and expectations about inflation, 
expectations about supply and income trends, and the completion rate, etc. If supply 
and all other factors are given, however, housing prices will simply rise with incomes 
and decline with the interest rate. In general, when the policy environment is stable, 
and when the housing market is more or less in equilibrium, incomes and interest 
rates would be the predominant factors driving housing prices.   
 
Following the economic base theory, in a small open economy incomes are 
closely tied to exports. Exports, apart from interest rates, is then a key factor driving 
housing prices. If exports are the main driving force behind a small open economy‘s 
incomes, and if this initial income increase translates into demand for housing, then 
                                                 
12
 Mr. Tung in an interview with reporters in June 2000 unexpectedly made the statement that the 
85000 a year production target was no longer government policy.  Earlier on, a story in Apple 
Daily(July 6, 1999) reported that land lease conversions and land exchange in the first half of the year 
would provide 16785 housing units, a new record in recent history.  Plot ratios were also increased 
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there are three effects on domestic consumption and domestic investment. There is 
first the direct multiplier effect working through developers‘ construction 
expenditures and payments of land premiums to the government (the ―basic sector‖ 
O‘Sullivan, 2003, pp.120-122.). There is also a second order effect working through 
the wealth effect as the prices of housing rise (Cutler, 2005). The third effect is 
through the credit channel. Many small and medium enterprises obtain their 
financing of their business activities through borrowing, and the rise in the collateral 
value of housing boosts borrowing.(Gerlach and Peng, 2005) 
 
 Thus, I have a recursive model with an ―exports multiplier‖ linking exports to 
domestic demand. The housing market provides a ―transmission mechanism‖ 
whereby the ―growth engine‖ of the economy, i.e., exports, gives rise to the 
secondary effects of ―non-basic‖ sector activities through various input-output 
relationships. 
 
These relations can be summarized by the following equations: 
 
LnPPI = α1 + β1LnEX + γMR + εt    -------------------- [1] 
(β1>0, γ<0 and λ > 0) 
 
LnDD = α2 + β2 LnPPI +εt            --------------------[2] 
(β2>0) 
 
where PPI is the property(housing) price index, EX is total exports, DD is 
domestic demand and MR is mortgage rate. 
 
[1] is a reduced form equation collapsing the effects of supply and demand 
                                                                                                                                          
over the years. 
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assuming the housing market is in moving equilibrium over time. While most authors 
use income--in particular GDP--growth as the key driving variable for housing prices 
(Tsatsaronis, Kostas and Haibin Zhu, 2004, Phillips and Goodstein, 2000) I prefer to 
focus only on exports because exports is exogenous.  In contrast, measures such as 
the GDP include consumption and will be affected by housing prices.
13
   
 
Equation [2] depicts private domestic demand as solely dependent on home 
prices, which is obviously too simplistic to be a theory to explain private domestic 
demand. The simplified specification, however, is intended to highlight the recursive 
nature of the key variables, and does not portend that variables such as government 
expenditures, interest rates, and current incomes do not play a role in determining 
private domestic demand.   
 
This study employs quarterly data from 1984 to 2004. This is a period with a 
stable monetary regime as well as a period of relative political stability after the 
signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration removing much of the uncertainty about 
Hong Kong future. Figure 1 – 4 show the movements of the four key variables. For 
the source and definition of variables that are analyzed, see Appendix 1.  
 
4.2 Empirical Results 
a. Test Results for Unit Roots 
I begin the estimation by testing the stationary properties of the variables using 
                                                 
13
 Tsatsaronis and Zhu(2004) used the structural vector autoregression approach and regressed each 
variable on a number of lags of all endogenous variables, which include: house price inflation, the 
growth rate of GDP, the real short-term interest rate, the term spread, inflation and the growth rate of 
real bank credit to the private sector.  Ours is a simpler approach but essentially capture similar 
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the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF). The following equation is estimated for each 
of the time series:  
∑
1
110 ηΔδβααΔ
k
i
tititt XXtX
=
++++=
          
where Δ is the first difference operator, t is the time trend, k denotes the 
number of lags used and  is the error term. The null hypothesis that series X is 
non-stationary can be rejected if  is statistically significant with negative sign. The 
optimal lag k, is chosen by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Table 3 shows 
that the test statistics for all the series in level form and in their first differences, 
respectively. The fact that the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected when 
the series are in level but can be rejected when the series are in first differences 
clearly indicates that all the series in the system are integrated of order one, and 
therefore no further unit root tests are performed.  
 
b. Test Results for Cointegration 
Since the variables are integrated of order one I(1), the next step is to carry out 
co-integration analyses of the variables. I first identify the long-run relationship 
among our variables by using the Johansen procedure. I chose the lag structure by 
using the Akaike‘s Information Criterion (AIC), which determines VAR=2. The 
cointegration test results are presented in Table 4. The number of co-integrating 
vectors r is determined by reference to the λmax and the trace statistics. As can be 
seen, the trace value indicate that there are two cointegrating vectors (r = 2) among 
the four variables at 5% significant level while λ max indicates only one 
cointegrating relation. Based on the results, r=2 was chosen for the VECM model.  
                                                                                                                                          
variables, except that we used exports rather than GDP. 
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Table 3.  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Unit Root (1984Q1 to 2009Q4 ) 
Variable name Test on No Trend Trend Conclusion 
 
LnPPI 
 
Level 
1st diff 
-1.2218 
-6.2372*** 
-1.5239 
-6.2302*** 
I(1) 
 
 
LnEX Level 
1st diff 
-2.7314* 
-5.2713*** 
-1.0878 
-5.9228*** 
I(1) 
 
 
LnDD 
 
Level 
1st diff 
-2.3716 
-3.4821*** 
-1.0059 
-4.9843*** 
I(1) 
 
 
MR Level 
1st diff 
-1.9483 
-10.9872*** 
-2.9910 
-10.946*** 
I(1) 
Note: 
1.  5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests that include constant; and constant plus 
trend = -2.8861. and -3.4480 respectively. 
2. The numbers of lags in the two unit root tests are determined by the AIC  
3. *** and * indicates 1% and 10% significance level respectively. 
 
 
Table 4.  Johansen Cointegrating Test Result (1984Q1 to 2009Q4) 
Variables Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
Test 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical Value 
 
LnPPI, LnEX, 
LnDD, MR 
Trace tests: 
r = 0 
r≦1 
r≦2 
 
λ max tests: 
r = 0 
r = 1 
r = 2 
 
r > 0 
r > 1 
r > 2 
 
 
r = 1 
r = 2 
r = 3 
Trace Value 
58.55**** 
31.17** 
14.78* 
 
λ max Value 
27.38* 
16.39 
11.32 
Trace Value 
47.86 
29.79 
15.49 
 
λ max Value 
27.58 
21.13 
14.26 
Notes:  
1. *** and ** denotes significance at 1% and 5% level respectively 
2. Test assumption: No linear deterministic trend in the data 
3. r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. 
4. VAR = 2 is determined by AIC criterion. 
 
Having determined that the number of cointegrating vectors r = 2, the next step 
is to identify the cointegrating vectors and to test if the restrictions suggested by our 
theoretical model(i.e. excluding domestic demand from the first cointegrating 
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equation, and the total exports and prime rate from the second cointgrating equation) 
are statistically acceptable.  
 
Table 5. Normalized Long-run Cointegrating Coefficients & Test of Restrictions 
 LnPPI LnEX LnDD MR 
Relation 1 1 -1.9004*** 
(-7.4452) 
0 0.0461** 
(2.0272) 
Relation 2 -0.7561*** 
(-16.4560) 
0 1 0 
Test of cointegration restrictions: 
H0= β13 = 0, and β22 = β24 = 0 
LR Test: χ2 = 1.25637, p-value = 0.2623 
Notes:   1. *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
  2. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  
 
The estimated cointegrating equations and the results on test of restrictions are 
reported in the Table 5. The test on cointegration restrictions, as explained in 
Boswijk (1996), is a log-likelihood ratio (LR) test with a chi-squared distribution. If 
the test statistics is high (i.e. p<0.05), then the LR test rejects the imposed restrictions. 
The LR static to our restrictions (i.e. Ho: β13 = 0, and β22 = β24 = 0) is 1.0747 with a 
P-value of 0.2999. Therefore, our restrictions are accepted and so our prior 
hypotheses are not rejected.  
 
The first cointegrating vector suggests there is a positive relation between 
property price and exports, and a negative relation between property price and 
mortgage rate. The second vector suggests a positive relationship between property 
price and private domestic demand. As Table 5 shows, all the variables carry the 
expected signs and in particular the coefficients for LnPPI (in CoinEq 2) and LnEX 
(in CoinEq 1) are significant at 1% level. The above estimation implies the following 
VEC model: 
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Table 6.  Vector Error Correction Model Estimation 
 Dependent Variable: 
 D(LnPPI) D(LnDD) 
ECM 1 (-1) -0.0855 
(-2.7659)** 
-0.0331 
(-2.7221)** 
ECM 2 (-1) 0.0113 
(0.1648) 
-0.0751 
(-2.7759)** 
D(LnPPI(-1)) 0.3703 
(3.3620)** 
0.1268 
(2.9232)** 
D(LnEX(-1)) -0.3175 
(-1.6668)* 
0.0302 
(0.4025) 
D(LnDD(-1)) 0.3553 
(1.1946) 
-0.0008 
(-0.0074) 
D(MR(-1)) -0.0020 
(-0.3274) 
0.0031 
(1.2803) 
Constant 0.1774 
(3.3957)*** 
0.0689 
(3.3476)*** 
Notes:  
1. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
2. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  
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where γ1 and γ2 are the error correction term (cointegrating vectors estimated in 
the Table 5), and θ1 and θ2 are the adjustment coefficients. The VEC model is 
reported in Table 6. The cointegrating vectors indicate a stable long-run relationship 
among the variables and the coefficients associated with the error correction term 
indicate the direction and speed of adjustment of each variable in the system towards 
its long-rum equilibrium.  
 
c. Granger Causality between Housing Price and Domestic Private Demand 
I now test the direction of causality between domestic private demand and 
housing prices. Based on the equations (3) and (4), the short-run causal relation 
between the variables can be investigated by applying a Waldχ2-test of the joint 
significance of the lags of other explanatory variables in the equation. As far as our 
focus is concerned, the null hypotheses being tested are: H0: σ1= 0 and H0 β2= 0.  
The results of temporal Granger causality test is shown in the Table 7
14
. Clearly, only 
the null hypothesis of LnPPI does not Granger-cause LnDD is rejected at 5% 
significance level. Therefore, based on the result, I conclude that the direction of 
causality only runs from LnPPI to LnDD but not the other way round.
15
 
Table 7. Temporal Granger Causality Test Result 
Dep. Variable Null Hypothesis Chi-sq  Prob 
DLnDD 
DLnPPI 
LnPPI does not cause LnDD 
LnDD does not cause LnPPI 
8.5448 
1.4271 
0.0035*** 
0.2322 
Notes:   1. *** denotes significance at 1%.  2. D denotes first difference 
 
                                                 
14
 Diagnostic tests (test on serial correlation and normality) indicate well-behaved residuals. For 
space consideration, the results are not reported here but are available upon request.  
15
 It should be noted that the Granger causality test does not by itself establish any causal relationship.  
It does, however, provide a test to falsify any hypothesized causal relationship.  Our test results are 
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d. Results of Variance Decompositions and Impulse Responses 
The above analysis provides evidence on the existence of long-run cointegrating 
relations among the variables and also of a short-run casual relation between the 
property price and domestic demand. To provide a more comprehensive analysis of 
causal relationship (both in short run and long run) and dynamic properties of the 
model, the variance decomposition and impulse response analysis will be conducted 
in this section.  
 
Impulse response functions show the response paths of each endogenous 
variable to a one-time shock (=one standard deviation) to other variables in the 
system. As far as our research focus is concerned, I am interested in the response of 
housing price and domestic demand to shocks in other variables.  Figure 1 shows 
the response of housing price to one standard deviation shocks in LnEX, MR, LnDD 
and the housing price itself.
16
 It indicates that there is a positive effect of LnEX on 
the LnPPI and a negative effect of MR on LnPPI. Figure 2 plots the response of 
domestic demand to various shocks. As can be seen, domestic demand increases 
sharply during the first three quarters following a shock in the housing price and this 
impact will then weaken over a longer time horizon. The figure also confirms that the 
domestic demand responds positively to a shock in exports and negatively to a shock 
in interest rate. 
 
To assess the relative importance of these shocks, I then carry the variance 
decomposition analysis. This shows the proportion of the variance of the forecast 
error for each variable that is attributed to shocks (one standard deviation innovation) 
                                                                                                                                          
consistent with the hypothesized causal directions. 
 54 
to each endogenous variable in the system including its own. Table 8 reports the 
results of variance decompositions for LnDD and LnPPI with a 16 quarter (4 years) 
horizon (also see Figure 3 and 4). I do not report the results for LnEX and PR as the 
variations in these two variables are largely explained by their own innovations 
(more than 70 percent).  
 
As can be seen in the Table 8(A) and Figure 3, the LnPPI forecast error variance 
(FEV) is dominated by movement in itself in the short run (about 90%), while it 
declines over a longer horizon. In the long run (about 4 years), about 18 percent of 
the forecast error variance of LnPPI can be explained by shocks in LnEX and LnDD 
respectively.  
 
Figure 1. Impulse Response of LnPPI to One Standard Deviation Shocks 
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16
 The results are insensitive to different ordering of the variables. 
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Figure 2. Impulse Response of LnDD to One Standard Deviation Shocks 
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Figure 3. Variance Decomposition of LnPPI 
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Figure 4. Variance Decomposition of LnDD 
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Table 8. Variance Decomposition Analysis 
 Period LnPPI LnDD LnEX MR 
A) Variance decomposition of LnPPI (%) 
1 100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
4 97.53 0.76 0.20 1.49 
8 87.16 4.07 3.70 5.06 
12 70.47 10.25 11.13 8.15 
16 54.44 17.43 18.48 9.65 
 
B) Variance Decomposition of LnDD(%) 
1 21.62  78.38  0.00  0.00  
4 47.53  50.30  1.85  0.32  
8 47.20  42.65  7.45  2.70  
12 37.66  42.20  14.83  5.32  
16 27.81  43.91  21.34  6.94  
 
For the LnDD (see Table 8(B) and Figure 84, interestingly, the proportion of 
variance explained by the LnPPI increases sharply during the 1-5 quarters from about 
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20% to 50% and then declines gradually afterward but still remains at around 30% in 
the long run. The MR shock is almost no effect on explaining the FEV of LnDD in 
the short run while it gains importance in longer time horizon. After 20 quarters later, 
it can explain about 7% of the FEV of the LnDD. Exports also explains a large 
proportion of FEV of LnDD (from below 10 percent in the short term and then up to 
above 20 percent after 16 quarters).  
 
These results indicates that property price has a strong and immediate impact on 
domestic demand in short run and it also supports our earlier findings that there is a 
short term unidirectional causality from property price to domestic demand. Besides, 
Hong Kong as a small and open economy, our analysis supports the argument that 
external sector - export in Hong Kong has generated significant positive impacts on 
property price and domestic demand in both the medium and the longer run. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
This paper has thrown light on an interesting role of the housing market in the 
economic base model. In a small open economy exports serves as the ―economic 
base‖ so that when exports grow the simulative effects are transmitted to the 
domestic economy and then generate second and higher order spending effect.  In 
this process the housing market appears to play a crucial role. If the housing market 
for some reason suddenly fails to draw capital or to retain capital in the domestic 
economy, it is difficult to think of a substitute that could play a similar role. 
 
Using Hong Kong data I have presented a statistical model that clearly indicates 
the effects of exports on housing prices and the crucial effects of housing prices on 
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domestic private spending. In Hong Kong, roughly 50-55% of all households living 
in private flats or subsidized sales flats own their homes, and this figure has remained 
very stable from 1999 to 2009.  This is not a particularly high figure in the 
developed world, suggesting that the effects of housing on domestic private spending 
are likely to be quite significant in countries like the US or the UK.   
 
I have presented evidence that housing prices are one of the driving forces 
behind growth in domestic consumption and spending in the non-basic sectors in 
general, including gross fixed capital investment. This does not, however, imply that 
the government should try to manipulate housing prices. When housing prices surge 
and there is worry about the formation of a bubble, it is important not to be tempted 
to artificially boost supply and thus cool down the market. If people pay too high a 
price and if prices subsequently decline, they will only have themselves to blame.  
Governments should always aim only at keeping supply close to the long run level of 
demand 
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Table 9.  List of Variables and their Definitions 
 
Short form 
 
 
Description 
  
Data Sources 
LnDD Log of domestic private spending = 
Log of (Private Consumption + Private 
construction + Machinery & Equipment 
(Private)), current price, seasonally 
adjusted using X11 from Eview 
Programme 
 
 Hong Kong Census and 
Statistics Dept 
 
LnEX Log total exports of goods and 
services , current price, seasonally 
adjusted using X11 from Eview 
Programme 
 
 Hong Kong Census and 
Statistics Dept 
 
LnPPI Log property price index (overall 
private domestic housing market) 
1989=100 
 Hong Kong Monthly Digest 
of Statistics, Hong Kong 
Census and Statistics Dept 
 
MR  Mortgage Rate(%)  Prime rate plus 0.5% prior to 
1997. Starting from 1997 
Jan, weighted average 
mortgage rate from 1997 to 
2009 was provided by Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper attempts to investigate the supply and demand dynamics of private 
housing market in Hong Kong. Many empirical researches on housing market are 
traditionally based on the assumption that market is almost in equilibrium status. 
Nevertheless, we can observed that housing market is more often in disequilibrium as 
reflected by asymmetric price movement where owners tend to hold a reservation 
price during the cold market and slow response of supply during excess demand. 
Using the cointegarting approach, the paper identifies two cointegrating relations, ie. 
a long run demand side relation between property price, prime rate, per capita GDP, 
expectation and private housing stock, and supply side relation between private 
housing completion, property price, and land cost, which shows a short run 
disequilibrium dynamics in demand and supply of private housing during 1984 – 
2008. Private housing price and supply adjust slowly to shocks would produce 
disequilibrium effects. Impulse response and variance decomposition are employed 
to shed light on the dynamics structure in the VECM model. The finding also 
indicates that the foreseeable supply level of private housing would have a positive 
impact on current price expectation. A predictable future housing supply would 
therefore help to stabilize potential home buyer‘s price expectation. The paper is 
divided into five sections. Section two discusses the sources of inefficiency in the 
private housing market and reviews literature. Section three develops the model used 
in this paper to explain the demand and supply adjustments of private housing market 
in Hong Kong. The empirical findings and policy recommendations on implementing 
a production target and subsidized sales flats are reported on Section four. Finally, 
Section five offers conclusions.  
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2. Costly Search, Reservation Demand, Inelastic Supply and Adjustment 
 
In many empirical studies of the housing market, the model assumes that supply 
and demand factors would interact simultaneously to determine the price level that 
clears the market. However, the spontaneous market clearing that equilibrates 
―turnover supply‖ with ―turnover demand‖ does not imply equilibrium in terms of 
longer term demand and longer term supply responses. The market price typically 
informs, along with earlier market prices and other market information, both the 
supply and the demand side and generally triggers further adjustments. First, there 
are several features of housing market which leads to delayed responses from both 
supply side and demand side. In particular, quality heterogeneity compounds the 
imperfect information problem to cause potential buyers to spend time in searching 
for a unit and owners are also subject to time cost for searching a buyer who may 
offer a higher price. Typically search characterize both buyers and sellers, as a result 
of which vacant homes waiting for buyers may exist even though the price ―clears 
the market‖ in some sense. At the market price some home sellers may decide to 
keep their homes and continue to look for better offers. In other words there is a 
―reservation demand‖ from the owners themselves that balances out with the 
apparent excess supply in the form of vacancy. 
 
Every housing unit in the market is unique in terms of quality, decoration, 
high/low floor, views, developers, location, etc. Given the uniqueness of each 
housing unit, price discovery is not as efficient as might be thought. In other words it 
is very difficult and time consuming for owners to obtain an accurate fair market 
price for their property. Sellers want to get the best price and search for the highest 
bidder, and the amount of time of this search is a key decision variable that is related 
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to the perceived marginal cost of search and the expected marginal benefit. Property 
developers have lots of units to be sold in the market and therefore they soon notice 
any difference in the speed at which the units are selling, and thus can respond with a 
price change quickly. Unlike a property developer, most sellers would only have one 
or two units to sell and they are also relatively inexperienced. If the market slows 
down, they may not be aware of it, and thus tends to be slow in revising the asking 
price. Leung (2006) recognized that fact that the uniqueness of housing unit and little 
experience selling for most home owners would produce price dispersion in the 
residential property market. The same is true for buyers who may have little 
experience buying, especially for first time buyers. They want to look for the better 
deal, and tend to extend their search time as long as the perceived benefit of search is 
higher than the cost. Different perceptions of these costs and benefits lead to 
divergent search time and possibly divergent offering prices. A higher price 
dispersion would induce owners and potential buyers to search further thereby 
increasing the natural vacancy rates. 
 
Home owners who want to sell a unit face a trade-off between higher expected 
price offer and longer expected time to sell. The owner may hold a unit vacant in 
search for a buyer who is willing to pay a higher price. While buyers also take time 
to compare the price and quality of all available units for sale in the market. Both 
sides do not have perfect information of all available potential buyers and all 
available units for sale. The owners may be able to gain information by searching the 
market or depending on property agents. If the reservation price is set at a relative 
high level, the search time for a buyer would increase significantly in terms of longer 
expected time to sale. Novy-Marx (2009) pointed out that in the markets 
characterized by costly search, price is not the only variable that adjusts to clear 
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markets. A positive demand shock will bring more buyers to the markets, improving 
the relative position of sellers, who then can meet potential buyers more frequently, 
reducing the expected time to sale.  
 
In the supply side, it is commonly believed that housing supply is fixed (or very 
inelastic) in short run. When there is a sudden increase in demand, the price will go 
up to clear the excess demand. The higher price for housing will then induce property 
developers to supply more housing units to the market as it becomes more profitable 
(long run supply is more elastic). However, developers production decision is not 
only based on current housing price level and current production costs but also on 
expected future price at which a flat will be sold, land availability for housing 
development and ability to expand production. It may take several years for the 
supply to adjust adequately to the price changes.  
 
Under these conditions, it is possible for housing prices to overshoot upward in 
the short run (deviated from its long run equilibrium path) when there is a sudden 
increase in housing demand. In the longer term, property developers gradually react 
to the increase in profitability and therefore a much greater supply of housing units is 
forthcoming, it is therefore entirely possible that housing price will overshoot 
(downward) again at the time when the new supply flows into the market in the 
longer term. The end result is that housing market is often characterized by sustained 
periods of disequilibrium. Although price ups and downs guide the market toward 
new equilibrium, the failure of supply to adjust efficiently to price changes seems to 
be an important source of disequilibrium thereby generating boom and bust cycle in 
the housing market. In case of Hong Kong where land is scarce and residential units 
are largely produced in form of high-rise building, the time lag for supply to catch up 
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with demand appears to be very difficult.  
 
3. Theoretical Considerations 
 
The housing market has both a flow dimension and a stock dimension. New 
investment, the flow dimension, is the sum of construction of new housing units and 
depreciation of existing units. The long-run supply, or stock of housing, is the 
accumulation of the new investment. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994, 1996) develop 
a stock-flow model and define the long-run equilibrium stock to be a function of 
price and a vector of cost-shifting variables (e.g. construction cost, land prices, 
interest rate). Housing demand theory defines the equilibrium demand for the current 
stock of housing as a function of price and a set of demand variables such as income, 
interest rate. The traditional assumption in the stock-flow model is that markets clear 
quickly and that prices adjust instantaneously to equate the demand for housing with 
the existing stock (see equation [1]). Where P is the housing price and X1 is the 
demand side variables such as interest rate, tax, income. P* in equation [1] is the 
equilibrium prices that bring supply and demand in equilibrium. Equation [2] 
indicates a price adjustment mechanism where σ is the adjustment coefficient. If σ =1, 
equilibrium price P* at time t equals to actual price P. When σ<1, it indicates the 
percentage at which actual prices would move to an equilibrium price (DiPasquale 
and Wheaton, 1994).  
 
),(),( 2
*
1
* XPSXPD tt                                       [ 1 ] 
1
* )1(  ttt PPP                                         [ 2 ] 
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In this study, I try to identify both the demand and supply side relations of 
private housing market in Hong Kong. The housing demand depends on the housing 
price (lnPPI) and a vector of demand-side variables X1, ie. interest rate (PR) and 
income (LnGDP) and price expectation (EXP). This relation can be summarized by 
the equation [3]. D is the total demand including turnover demand and potential 
sellers‘ reservation demand for total private housing stock. The housing stock was 
computed by using data on housing completions. Theoretically, quantity demand 
theory suggests that the housing demand is negatively related to housing price and so 
we will face a downward sloping demand curve. Conversely, the demand for housing 
is a negative function of the interest rate because higher interest rate increases the 
cost of consuming housing services (mortgage interest cost rise). In addition, income 
level would have a positive effect on housing demand. In housing economic 
literature, it is believed that price expectation is a key explanatory variable for 
housing demand. When people expect price will continue to go up further, end-user 
will enter the market to hedge for rising rental cost or mortgage payment and the 
price expectation will encourage investor to enter the market for short term profit or 
inflation protection. Given demand for housing is unobservable (actual transactions 
data may overstate the demand as housing units can be changed hands few times 
within a short period), a reduced form equation [ 5 ] is obtained by bring the equation 
[ 3 ] into [ 1 ].  S  is measured by the total stock of private housing units which is 
negatively related to housing price.  
 
ttttt EXPPRGDPPD 43210                      [ 3 ]   
( α1<0, α2>0, α3<0 and α4<0 ) 
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     Figure 1. Turnover Demand, Reservation Demand and Supply 
 
Note: Reservation demand is expected to fall with a higher price, given the same demand curve. In a 
hot market, however, potential sellers will search longer looking for a better price believing they can 
afford to wait. This translates to a higher reservation demand. This is as shown in the above diagram.  
However, the decline in reservation demand with a higher price for the same demand curve has not 
been shown for simplicity.) 
 
 
ttttt EXPPRPGDPPS 43210               [ 4 ] 
 
ttttt SEXPPRPGDPP
11
4
1
3
1
2
1
0 1








        [ 5 ] 
 
1
11
4
1
3
1
2
1
0
 tttttt ECMSEXPPRPGDPP 










       [ 6 ] 
 
The estimated equation [5] is the long run housing price level given the demand 
side variables including per capita GDP, prime rate, expectation and stock of housing. 
As discussed in the last section, market clearing that equilibrates ―turnover supply‖ 
Horizontal Gap represents 
reservation demand by sellers 
dC :Turnover 
demand in cold 
market 
DH: Total demand in hot market 
S: Housing stock 
dH :Turnover demand in hot 
market 
PC 
PH 
Dc: Total demand in cold market 
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with ―turnover demand‖ does not imply equilibrium in terms of longer term demand 
and longer term supply responses. Costly search (both buyers and sellers) and 
reservation demand from the home owners would fluctuate in the short term thereby 
contributing to a short term fluctuation in ―turnover supply‖, leading to a deviation of 
actual price from its long term value. Figure 1 illustrates that the turnover demand 
plus the reservation demand equal to the total demand or the total supply of housing 
stock. A rise in turnover demand to the right (from dc to dH) may arise from buyers 
cutting down the time of their search or an increase in the number of buyers. This 
will trigger a rise in the price prompting home sellers to lengthen their time of search 
for higher bids as the marginal cost of searching a higher bidder is lower when there 
are more potential buyers in the market. This will immediately translate into higher 
reservation demand and reduce ―turnover supply.‖ The total demand curve would 
shift from DC to DH and so the price level would be driven up in the short term to PC 
from PH. If the reservation demand drops when transactions increase, the price would 
be lie between the PH and PC depending on the changes in the level of reservation 
demand which depends on the marginal benefits and costs of searching faced both by 
the sellers and the potential buyers. While actual prices may deviate from their long 
run values temporarily but it should covert to its long run values in longer time 
horizon. The vector error correction model would help to investigate such adjustment. 
Let △Pt denote the change in housing price at time t, and )( PPP
e   , 
where σ capture the adjustment percentage at each period toward ―the long run 
equilibrium‖—which is the state consistent with ―normal search‖ on the part of 
buyers as well as ―on the part of sellers.‖  Any deviation from ―normal‖ or ―natural‖ 
search will trigger a momentary change in ―turnover demand‖ or ―turnover 
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supply.‖17  In the error correction model [ 6], ECM is the error correction term 
which equals to Pt-1 – P
e
t-1 , where P
e
 is the long run prices given the demand-side 
variables X1 and σ capture the adjustment percentage at each period toward the long 
run values.  
  
The supply of housing follows a differential equation (see equation [ 7] ) where 
the stock slowly depreciates at a rate δ and expands gradually with new construction, 
C, which depends on housing price, P, and other cost variables X2 such as land, 
interest, and building material cost. On the supply side, given that the demolition rate 
in Hong Kong during the last decade is just around 0.5% (Hong Kong Property 
Review, various years) and so I simply assume θ equal to zero. Therefore, supply 
of private housing at any time equal to the new housing completion, i.e. △S = C (P, 
X2). The supply side relations can by summarized by the equation [8]. The supply of 
housing as measured by the private housing completion (LnCOMP) is positively 
related to price so that the supply curve is upward slopping and the LnCOMP is 
negatively related to other cost variables X2. In the study, costs are proxied by the 
land cost and interest rate. Given that the current price level and cost variables should 
not have any influences on current housing completion, Ct in equation [8] is defined 
to lead 4 quarters (t+4) ahead of the supply side determinants at time t. The Ct is a 4 
quarter moving average data (average of current period and its past three quarters), 
therefore, any change in the independent variables will affect the future housing 
completion (around 1.5-2 years). 
 
                                                 
17
 Some ―norm‖ is implicit in the ―long run.‖   
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tttttt SSXPSSCS   )),(( 2
*
                  [ 7 ] 
tttt LANDPRPC 3210                         [ 8 ]              
(β1>0, β2<0, β3<0) 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
 
The land cost variable is an unpublished statistics conducted by the Censes and 
Statistics Department. All property developers (excluding those very small ones) in 
Hong Kong report an estimated land values for the first and fourth quarters including 
projects under construction and land reserve. It is believed that the land price is quite 
stable in short term so the data for second and third quarters are an average value of 
the first and fourth quarters (Q2 = Q1 + (Q4-Q1)/3, and Q3=Q2 + (Q4-Q1)/3). It is 
noted that the data on land price is only available starting from 1985 to 2008Q4. 
 
Many past studies indicate that price expectation play an important role in 
explaining housing price movements. Once prices have increased for a period of time, 
people would tend to believe that the upward trend will continue in foreseeable 
future (backward looking approach). Philips (1988) and Brown et al (1994) studies 
assumed that price expectations were formed by observing past and current values of 
different variables including inflation rate, interest rate. DiPasquale and Wheaton 
(1994) observed that using recent past prices data as a proxy for future price 
expectation would be problematic as they are highly correlated with the current price 
and therefore would lead to serial price correlation.  
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Figure 2. Price Expectation Proxied by the Gross “PE” Ratio of Homes 
(1984-2009Q4) 
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   Figure 3. Price Expectation Proxied by the Net Rental Yields  
     (1984-2009Q4) 
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Figure 4. Estimated Land Price per GFA sq. m.    
(1984-2008Q4) 
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Figure 5. Private Housing Completions  
(1984-2010Q1) 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
1
9
8
4
 
Q
1
1
9
8
5
 
Q
3
1
9
8
7
 
Q
1
1
9
8
8
 
Q
3
1
9
9
0
 
Q
1
1
9
9
1
 
Q
3
1
9
9
3
 
Q
1
1
9
9
4
 
Q
3
1
9
9
6
 
Q
1
1
9
9
7
 
Q
3
1
9
9
9
 
Q
1
2
0
0
0
 
Q
3
2
0
0
2
 
Q
1
2
0
0
3
 
Q
3
2
0
0
5
 
Q
1
2
0
0
6
 
Q
3
2
0
0
8
 
Q
1
2
0
0
9
 
Q
3
U
n
i
t
s
 
 
 73 
In this study, I borrow the concept of PE ratio in stock analysis to analysis the 
housing market. When a company with a higher PE ratio, investor would expect that 
the future profit growth rate (e.g. IT or new technology companies during IT bubbles) 
would be much faster than those company with low PE (e.g. public utilities 
companies). The ―PE ratios‖ in housing market are calculated as follows: average 
property price/m
2
 (P) to average rental income/m
2
 per month X 12 (E) (data obtained 
from Hong Kong Property Review, various years). Figure 2 shows that PE ratio of 
Hong Kong housing market. As can be seen, the PE ratio peaked at 27 in 1997 and 
then dropped to about 16 in 2003. In recent months, the PE ratio appears to be 
approaching the peak in 1997 again.  The willingness of people to accept a lower 
rental return in the property market in recent years could be a result of very low 
deposit rate. Instead of the gross rental yield, I shall consider the premium of the 
rental yield over the 3-months Hong Kong deposit rate. Based on this alternative 
measure, Figure 3 indicates a different pattern on picturing the housing price 
expectation. We can see that the yield (net return) equals to -1.3% in 1997 which 
means that people were willing to accept a negative return from rental income, 
indicating they should be very optimistic on the future price appreciation. The short 
term negative rental return was immaterial compared to the possible capital gain. In 
fact, housing unit as an illiquid asset should enjoy a higher return than holding cash. 
When people were willing to accept a negative net return, as in 1997, their 
expectation about price appreciation must be very optimistic. In 2009, even though 
the Hong Kong property price had risen over 30% from the bottom at the Financial 
Tsunami in late 2008, the net yield was still a positive 3.84% in 2009Q4 which is 
still higher the 25 years average (3.53%). The net yield variable is employed in this 
study as a proxy of price expectation. Given that the more negative net yield reflects 
higher price expectation, therefore, it is expected that the net yield and property 
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prices are negatively related.  
 
For the source and definition of other variables that are analyzed, please see 
Appendix 1. Figure 4 – 5 show the movements of the key variables. This study 
employs quarterly data from 1984 to 2008. This is a period with a stable monetary 
regime as well as a period of relative political stability after the signing of the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration removing much of the uncertainty about Hong Kong 
future. This study basically follows the work of DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) and 
Yong (2004) by using a cointegration approach which can help to identify any 
short-run and long run relations among variables and investigate the disequilibrium 
structure.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
4.1.  Supply and Demand Dynamics of Housing Market  
a.  Test Results for Unit Roots 
We begin the estimation by testing the stationary properties of the variables 
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981). The 
following equation is estimated for each of the time series:  
∑
1
110 ηΔδβααΔ
k
i
tititt XXtX

    
 
where Δ is the first difference operator, t is the time trend, k denotes the 
number of lags used and  is the error term. The null hypothesis that series X is 
non-stationary can be rejected if  is statistically significant with negative sign. The 
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optimal lag k, is chosen by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Table 1 shows 
that the test statistics for all the series in level form and in their first differences, 
respectively. The fact that the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected when 
the series are in level but can be rejected when the series are in first differences 
clearly indicates that all the series in the system are integrated of order one, and 
therefore no further unit root tests are performed.  
 
Table 1.  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Unit Root (Period: 1984 to 2008 ) 
Variable name Test on No Trend Trend  Conclusion 
LnLAND Level 
1st diff 
-2.3755 
-3.1851** 
-1.2543 
-3.8325** 
I(1) 
 
LnPGDP Level 
1st diff 
-2.4056 
-4.1315*** 
-1.2939 
-5.0592*** 
I(1) 
 
PR  
 
Level 
1st diff 
-2.6159* 
-3.6437*** 
-3.2236* 
-3.8136** 
I(1) 
 
LnCOMP Level 
1st diff 
-1.5716 
-7.6831*** 
-2.2882 
-7.8391*** 
I(1) 
 
EXPInverse 
 
Level 
1st diff 
-2.7600* 
-3.2357** 
-2.9722 
-3.2613* 
I(1) 
 
LnGSTOCK 
 
Level 
1st diff 
-1.9437 
-5.5817*** 
-2.3584 
-5.6519*** 
I(1) 
 
LnSTOCK 
 
Level 
1st diff 
-2.7057 
-2.8813** 
-0.2987 
-3.57014** 
I(1) 
 
Note: 
1.  5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests that include constant; and constant 
plus trend = -2.8892 and -3.4500 respectively. 
2. The numbers of lags in the two unit root tests are determined by the AIC  
3. *, ** and *** indicates 10, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
 
b.  Test Results for Cointegration 
The variables were largely confirmed by ADF test as in order one I(1), the next 
step is to carry out co-integration analyses of the variables. The cointegation analysis 
is applied to equation (5) and (9). I chose the lag structure by using the Akaike‘s 
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Information Criterion (AIC), which determines 3 lags in VECM. 
  
The cointegration test results are presented in Table 2. The number of 
co-integrating vectors r is determined by reference to the λmax and the trace statistics. 
As can be seen, λ max statistics indicate that there are two cointegrating vectors (r = 
2) among the six variables at 5% significant level while the trace statistic indicate 
that r=3. The results are generally consistent with the previous discussion and I will 
proceed on the analysis with two cointegrating vectors.  
 
Table 2.  Johansen Cointegrating Test Result (Period 1986 to 2008) 
Variables Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
Test 
Statistics 
LnPPI, LnPGDP, 
PR, LnCOMP,  
LnLAND, 
EXPInverse, 
LnPSTOCK  
Trace tests: 
r = 0 
r≦1 
r≦2 
 
λ max tests: 
r = 0 
r = 1 
r = 2 
 
r > 0 
r > 1 
r > 2 
 
 
r = 1 
r = 2 
r = 3 
Trace Value 
178.88*** 
112.68*** 
74.01** 
 
λ max Value 
66.14*** 
38.67** 
30.96 
Notes:  
1. *** and ** denote 1% and 5% significant level respectively 
2. Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data 
3. r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. 
4. Lags interval = 3 is determined by AIC criterion. 
5. 98Q1 dummy is treated as exogenous variable 
 
Having determined that the number of cointegrating vectors r = 2, the next step 
is to identify the cointegrating vectors and to test if the restrictions suggested by our 
theoretical model(i.e. including the demand side variables in the first cointegrating 
equation, and the supply side variables in the second cointgrating equation) are 
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statistically acceptable. The estimated cointegrating equations and the results on test 
of restrictions are reported in the Table 3. The LR static to the restrictions (i.e. H0= 
β14 =β15 = 0 and β22 = β26=β27 = 0) is 6.7243 with a P-value of 0.081. Therefore, the 
restrictions are accepted and so our prior hypotheses are not rejected at 5% 
significant level. 
 
Table 3. Normalized Long-run Cointegrating Coefficients & Test of restrictions 
Variables CointEq 2 
(Demand Model) 
LnPPI 
CointEq 2 
(Supply Model) 
LnCOMP 
 
LnPPI 1 
 
-1.2609 
(-4.1209)*** 
LnPGDP -1.6797 
(-15.2892)*** 
0.00 
PR 0.0821 
(6.9910)*** 
0.1549 
(5.0685)*** 
LnCOMP 0 
 
1 
 
LnLAND 0 
 
1.0793 
(3.2102)*** 
EXPInverse 0.1106 
(9.3099)*** 
0 
LnPSTOCK 1.4478 
(10.2283)*** 
0 
Constant -19.0037 -14.6363 
 
Test of cointegration restrictions: 
H0= β14 =β15 = 0 and β22 = β26=β27 = 0 
LR Test: χ2 = 6.7243, p-value = 0.0768 
Notes:   1. ** and *** denotes significance at 5% and 1%%level respectively.  
2. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  
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All variables in cointegrating equation 1 and 2 carry with a significant expected 
signs. The first cointegrating vector (demand side) suggests there is a negative 
relation between prime rate, private housing stock, expectation (more negative = 
higher expectation) and property price. The housing demand is positively related to 
the PGDP. The second vector (supply side) suggests the private housing completion 
is positively related to the property price, and negatively related to the cost variables: 
prime rate and land Price. 
 
c.  Identifying Long Run Relation  
The above modeling identifies two long run relations among the six variables i.e. 
for the 1) demand side: LnPPI = 1.6797*LnPGDP – 0.0821*PR – 
0.1106*EXPInverse – 1.4478*LnPSTOCK + 19.0037 and for the 2) supply side: 
LnCOMP = 1.2610*LnPPI – 0.1549*PR – 1.0793*LnLAND+14.6363. Figure 5 
shows the two restricted cointegrating vectors. Both vectors appear to be stationary 
throughout the study period and mean reverting. The deviations of the vectors to its 
long run value can be regards as short term disequilibrium or shocks in the housing 
demand and supply.  
 
As can be seen in the Figure 6, the demand of the stock of housing in general 
appears to be quite stable between 1985 and 1997 given the prevailing level of 
income, housing price and interest rate. The demand of the stock of housing had 
experienced an obvious decline from 1997 to 2003. The period covered both the 
Asian Financial Crisis and the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS)—the public housing 
privatization program of the Housing Authority. The first paper provided strong 
evidence that the effect of TPS on the demand for housing was significantly larger 
than that of the Asian Financial Crisis. In 1996 and 1997 close to 10,000 households 
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gave up their units each year, after 1997 the flow out of public rental housing fell 
suddenly. The immediate effect of the TPS is that buyers almost disappeared 
completely from the HOS market. The prices of private housing units, which had all 
along depended on HOS owners to trade up, also plummeted. We should therefore 
expect that the housing price should decrease in order to ensure the housing demand 
would adjust upward to its long run level. The adjustment took few years and until 
2004, we could see there was a strong rebound in the demand for housing.  
 
Figure 6. Residuals from CointEq1 (Demand Side) & CointEq2 (Supple Side) 
 
 
Note: 
Cointegrating Eq(1):  LnPPI = 1.6797*LnPGDP – 0.0821*PR – 0.1106*EXPInverse – 
1.4478*LnPSTOCK + 19.0037  
Cointegrating Eq (2):  LnCOMP = 1.2610*LnPPI – 0.1549*PR – 1.0793*LnLAND+14.6363 
 
On the supply side, as can be seen in the Figure 6, the supply of private housing 
in general appears to have been quite fluctuated between during the study period 
given the prevailing level of housing price, land cost and interest rate. In 1996, 
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LnCOMP obviously had been below its desired level significantly. This could be the 
outcome of the anti-speculation measures announced in June 1994. The property 
price had been dropped nearly 2 years afterward. Since the building of new units 
needs to take few years to complete, the response of supply would be very slow 
(inelastic) in the short run. Therefore, the supply gap was occurred 2 years later in 
response to the introduction of anti-speculation measures and policy uncertainty.  
 
On the other hand, during 2000 and 2003, we can see the supply of housing 
returned to above its long run desired level. This could be the result of the slow 
supply response to the high level of housing price during 1996-1997, contributing to 
an overshooting in supply in 2000 to 2003. The increase in supply during this period 
was also attributed to the 85,000 announced in 1997. For the vector to return to its 
long run level, either the supply of housing or housing price (or both) must adjust 
downward. Therefore, unless the supply of housing contracted significantly, it is 
expected that the housing prices should decrease. This is also consistent with the 
evidence of the housing price downward trend during the 2000 and 2003.  
 
In view of the continuing weakness of the housing market—amounting to close 
to 70% of decline since the peak in 1997, the government essentially reversed its 
earlier policy of increasing supply and selling public housing cheaply.  Housing 
Secretary Michael Suen announced ―Nine measures‖ to stabilize the market in late 
2002.   
 
From then on the government began to control the land supply through the land 
application list system. Since then, the supply of private housing has dropped below 
the equilibrium for a few years and we can see the disequilibrium was relatively 
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large in 2008. In retrospect, the Hong Kong government intervened the housing 
supply three times, i.e. in 1994, 1997 and 2002. Intervention each time, however, 
would only end up with either a surplus or a shortage in supply a few years after 
policies were implemented, undermining the market forces to restore equilibrium.  
This time around, however, reversing the TPS program has been seen as fundamental 
to the long term recovery of the Hong Kong housing market (Ho and Wong, 2005). 
 
d.  Impulse Responses 
The above analysis provides evidence on the existence of long-run cointegrating 
relations among the variables. To provide a more comprehensive analysis of short 
term dynamic properties of the model, the impulse response analysis will be 
conducted in this section.  
 
Impulse response functions show the response paths of each endogenous 
variable to a one-time shock (=one standard deviation) to other variables in the 
system. As far as the research focus is concerned, I am interested in the responses of 
LnCOMP and LnPPI to shocks in other variables
18
. Figure 7 plots the response of 
LnPPI to various shocks. As can be seen, the negative effects of PR and LnCOMP on 
LnPPI are strong in the short term and these impacts are weaken in the long run and 
the impacts of interest rate is even positive in longer time horizon. A shock to 
LnLAND and LnPGDP induce strong positive impacts on LnPPI, in particularly, the 
impact of shock in LnPGDP on LnPPI is very significant in short run and this effect 
will remain over time. As expected, the EXP has a negative impact on the LnPPI and 
the impact will remain over a longer time horizon.  
                                                 
18
 The results are insensitive to different ordering of the variables. 
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Figure 8 shows the responses of LnCOMP to one standard deviation shocks in 
LnPPI, LnPGDP, PR, LnLAND, EXP. The negative effect of LnLAND on LnCOMP 
is quite substantially negative in the short term and its effect remains stable in the 
long run. A shock to housing price (LnPPI) has no impacts on completion for the 
first two quarters and it induces only a moderate increase in LnCOMP after fours 
quarters and then the positive effect remains stable up to 20 quarters. A shock to 
LnPGDP on LnCOMP is also positive in short run only (up to 2 quarters) and 
diminishes eventually. Interest rate only generates a short term impacts on LnCOMP. 
Overall, the supply of housing are not responsive to housing price in short run 
supporting the views that there is a large constraints on the supply side of the market.  
 
Figure 7. Impulse Responses of LnPPI to One Standard Shocks 
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Figure 8. Impulse Responses of LnCOMP to One Standard Shocks 
 
 
e.  Price Expectation and Supply Dynamics 
As mentioned, government intervention often ends up with either a surplus or a 
shortage in supply. Given that any plan to increase supply will not affect actual 
supply after at least three or four years, trying to adjust the supply to demand appears 
to be out of the question. In recent months, there is a widespread belief that with the 
supply of housing remaining at historical low levels for the coming few years, 
housing price should continue to go up further in foreseeable future. Instead of trying 
to adjust supply to a fluctuating demand, should the government set up an annual 
production target, such as one based on a 10 year average of housing units taken up , 
or one based on household formation or other demographic data? In this section, I 
will investigate the relation between the future private housing production (actual 
total completion for coming two year) and price expectation.  
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The cointegration test results are presented in Table 4. The number of 
co-integrating vectors r is determined by reference to the λmax and the trace statistics. 
As can be seen, λmax statistic indicates that there is one cointegrating vectors among 
between the two variables at 10% significant level while the Trace statistic indicates 
that there is no cointegration. I will proceed on the analysis with one cointegrating 
vector.  
 
Table 4.  Johansen Cointegrating Test Result (Period 1986o 2008) 
Variables Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
Test 
Statistics 
EXP and lnFCOMP Trace tests: 
r = 0 
r≦1 
 
λ max tests: 
r = 0 
r = 1 
 
r > 0 
r > 1 
 
 
r = 1 
r = 2 
Trace Value 
12.56 
0.18 
 
λ max Value 
12.38* 
0.18 
Notes:  
1. * denotes 10 % significant level 
2. Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data 
3. r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. 
4. Lags interval = 2 is determined by AIC criterion. 
5. 98Q1 dummy is treated as exogenous variable 
 
Table 5.  Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients Using the Johansen Procedure 
Cointegrating equation: 
EXP = f (LnFCOMP) 
Coefficient t-statistic 
EXP 1  
LnFCOMP -4.5894 2.4882** 
Notes:  1. ** denotes significance at 5% level 
  2. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion. 
  3. D98 and interactive dummies are treated as exogenous I(0) variables in the   
        cointegrating equation. 
 
The estimated cointegrating equation is reported in the Table 5. The completion 
of private housing units for t + 8 (2 years) is positively related to the EXP at time t. 
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The coefficient is significant with the expected sign. That is: the lower the 
completion of private units for the coming two years, the higher will be the 
expectation for a price increase today and therefore affect the current housing price 
level. Hong Kong‘s experiences tell us that the government intervened the market 
when it almost at the peak or bottom of the cycle while the economic cycle could 
change much faster than the changes in supply as it is very inelastic in the short run. 
 
Figure 9. Number of Domestic Households („000) and  
Owner-occupiers % 1982-2009 
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Just as William Poole (2001) observed, it is very important that the central bank 
not take a position on the level of prices in asset markets. ―It is very easy to be wrong 
about the appropriate level; the judgment ought to be left to the market.‖ For a small 
open economy blessed with low tax rates, respect for the rule of law, excellent 
infrastructure and market institutions, a well educated labor force, an efficient civil 
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service, and laissez faire policy, housing and office prices are likely to be high 
because these favorable factors tend to attract capital. But this is in itself not a cause 
for concern. If the importance of the housing sector in the economy is a natural 
outcome of market forces and the natural development of the economy, there must be 
a good reason for it. On the other hand, it will not be desirable to artificially boost 
housing prices by limiting supply or cool down the market by boosting supply. The 
supply should be set at levels commensurate with the needs of the community as 
suggested by such factors as household formation and general economic conditions. 
In fact, the demand for housing are relatively stable, the government can set up a 
production target using the past 5 or 10 years housing unit take up or household 
formation data as a reference (Figure 9). Potential home buyer‘s price expectation 
would be more stable if the future supply is certain. 
 
f.  Causality between Property Price and Land Price 
This section attempts to test the direction of causality between LnLAND and 
LnPPI. The short-run causal relation between the variables can be investigated by 
applying a Waldχ2-test of the joint significance of the lags of other explanatory 
variables based on the equations [9] and [10],. As far as the focus is concerned, the 
null hypothesis being tested are: H0 : β4= 0 (eq 9) and H0 : β1= 0 (eq 10). The results 
of temporal Granger causality test is shown in the Table 6. Clearly, only the null 
hypothesis of LnLAND does not Granger-cause LnPPI is rejected at 10% 
significance level. Therefore, based on the result, we can conclude that the direction 
of causality only runs from LnLAND to LnPPI but not the other way round.
19
   
                                                 
19
 It should be noted that the Granger causality test does not by itself establish any causal relationship.  
It does, however, provide a test to falsify any hypothesized causal relationship.   
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Table 6.  Temporal Granger Causality Test Result 
Dep.Variable Null Hypothesis Chi-sq  Prob 
DLnLAND 
DLnPPI 
LnPPI does not cause LnLAND 
LnLAND does not cause LnPPI 
1.3547 
6.7039 
0.7162 
0.0820* 
Notes: 
1. * denotes significance at 10%. 
2. D denotes first difference 
 
The result appears opposite to what economic theory would predict. As the land 
input is a derived demand of housing production which is driven by housing price, 
the direction of causality should run from land price to housing price. Nevertheless, 
every housing unit in the market is unique in terms of quality, decoration, high/low 
floor, views, developers, location, etc. Given the uniqueness of each housing unit, 
price discovery is not as efficient as might be thought, in other words it is therefore 
very difficult and time consuming for owners to obtain an accurate fair market price 
for their property.  Perhaps, people may have to check recent property transactions 
with similar characteristics and then compare with their one, and even different 
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banks or property appraisers would provide different price estimations to a flat. 
These indicate an accurate estimated price of property involves a high information 
cost.  
 
On the other hand, the result of land auction is dispatched quickly and 
understood easily. The land auction results also reflect the expectation of future 
housing price estimated by property developers. In this senses, it is entirely possible 
for the causality runs from the land price to housing price.  Having said this, it 
remains true that past land prices do not imply today‘s housing prices, for housing 
prices tend to be forward looking and not backward looking. 
 
4.2  Supply of Subsided Sale Unit (HOS): Does it Affect Private Housing 
Market? 
 
 In recent years, some commentators argued that the increase in supply of 
housing, in particular, the HOS housing would produce negative impacts on housing 
price and transaction. In fact, HOS housing is not a new thing to the public and it has 
long been an important part of housing market during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
I argued that the HOS housing unit provided public housing tenants with the 
first step in the home ownership ladder so that they could begin to move up to higher 
quality housing. HOS housing is in the middle of the homeownership ladder between 
public housing and private housing. The homeownership ladder refers to the 
tendency for homeowners to trade their existing homes for more expensive, better 
homes when they have accumulated sufficient equity in their homes and other 
savings, and when their ability to service larger loans has gone up. Both 
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Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) as well as Ho, Ma, and Haurin (2008) provided 
theoretical frameworks explaining the working of the homeownership ladder. For a 
tenant to become a homeowner, he will need to have accumulated enough savings for 
the down-payment, which is not only always required in Hong Kong
20
 but will help 
reduce the mortgage payments down the road.   
 
Figure 10. Completion of HOS housing 1983Q4-2010Q1 (average of 4 quarters) 
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Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, various years, Censes and Statics Dept of HKSAR 
government 
 
 
Prior to 1998, HOS homeowners always made a handsome profit when they 
eventually sold their units, notwithstanding the repayment of the implicit land cost 
subsidy.  They could sell their units in the open market after having lived in their 
units for over 10 years upon repaying such premium subsidies.  Starting in June 
                                                 
20
 Banks are not permitted to lend more than 60% or 70% of their appraised values, depending on the 
value of the homes.  In recent years, this was relaxed but only if the borrower pays an extra premium 
and gets coverage for default insurance. 
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1997, there was a new arrangement called the HOS Secondary Market, which is a 
market with buyers restricted to ―Green Form Applicants,‖21 who are predominantly 
public rental housing tenants. HOS owners were allowed to sell from the fourth year 
after purchase provided that they sold to such Green Form Applicants, and as long as 
they sell to such applicants, they would not need to repay the implicit land cost 
subsidy.
22
 The fact that such transactions in the ―secondary market‖ in 1997 were at 
very high prices (see Table 7) suggest that many public housing tenants were really 
cash-rich and that they had indeed played an important part in the very strong 
housing market in 1996 and 1997 at the time.   
 
Table 7.  Actual Transactions of HOS Units in the Secondary Market, Fu 
Keung Court* 
Usable 
floor area 
High, Middle, 
 or Low Floor 
Date of Agreement  
to Purchase 
Price  
US$,000 
Land Premium 
Discount 
Rate(%) 
 
644 Middle 09/1997 506.4 29 
 
644 High 11/1997 461.2 29 
 
645 Middle 04/1998 328.2 29 
 
645 Middle 10/1998 253.8 35 
 
* Fu Keung Court in Wang Tau Hom.  An exchange rate of HK$7.8 to 1 US dollar is assumed.  Sellers do not 
have to pay the land premium discount when they sell in the secondary market that is restricted to public housing 
tenants.  The buyer will however have to repay the land premium discount upon resale in the future.  The land 
premium discount is calculated from the formula (Market Price – Sale Price)/Market Price at the time of original 
purchase. Source: Downloaded from Housing Authority website at the time of writing from: 
http://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/chi/hd/hos/s_market/index.htm 
                                                 
21
 Other ―Green Form Applicants‖ include: Authorized occupants of Interim Housing (IH) of the HA, 
Allowance recipients of the HA's Rent Allowance for Elderly Scheme (RAES); Applicants on the 
Waiting List, Junior civil servants applying for the HALS under the Civil Service Public Housing 
Quota, Clearees and victims affected by clearance and natural disaster respectively, or Domestic 
tenants affected by Urban Renewal Authority's redevelopment programme. or Divorcees / splitting 
households of the HA estates who are issued with Green Form Certificates.  
22
 From June 1999, HOS owners can sell after two years from the date of purchase in the secondary 
market without repayment of the land premium subsidy.  The open market resale date was also 
reduced from 10 years to 5 years. 
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The policy to deny well-off tenants the benefits of housing subsidies was further 
stepped up in June 1996. Tenants paying double rent were required to declare their 
assets and would be required to pay market rent if the values of these assets exceeded 
specified limits. This policy provided a big incentive for the well-off tenants to buy 
in the private market or HOS housing and gave much impetus to housing prices 
through 1997. It is not surprising that 1996 and 1997 were the years with the greatest 
number of public housing units returned to the Housing Authority on record. 
 
A number of studies lend support to the ladder effect hypothesis. Stein(1995) 
suggests that transactions at the lower tiers of the housing ladder, which may be 
triggered by price increases, will lead to more transactions up the ladder. Ho, Ma, 
and Haurin (2008) further shows that housing prices of lower-tier housing lead 
housing prices in higher tiers, and that lower-tier housing transactions lead 
higher-tier housing transactions. In this section, I will investigate the relation 
between the actual completion of HOS housing and housing price by using the 
cointegration method. As the HOS housing served as the second step for public 
housing tenants to trade up in the ownership ladder, and part of the HOS owners will 
trade up for more expensive private housing after they have accumulated sufficient 
equity (through increase in price and increase in their ability to service larger loans), 
the completion of HOS unit should be positively related to the housing price in the 
long run. The dependent variable for the test is LnPPI. The explanatory variables 
include the log of the exports (LnTX), mortgage rate (MR), price expectation (EXP) 
and the log of the completion of HOS unit (LnGCOMP). 
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Table 8.  Johansen Cointegrating Test Result (Period 1985 to 2009Q4) 
Variables Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
Test 
Statistics 
LnPPI, LnEX, MR, 
EXP, LnGCOMP  
Trace tests: 
r = 0 
r≦1 
 
λ max tests: 
r = 0 
r = 1 
 
r > 0 
r > 1 
 
 
r = 1 
r = 2 
Trace Value 
84.83*** 
51.96** 
 
λ max Value 
32.88* 
23.51 
Notes:  
1. * denotes 10% level  
2. Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data 
3. r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. 
4. Lags interval = 3 is determined by AIC criterion. 
5. 98Q1 dummy is treated as exogenous variable 
 
Table 9.  Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients Using the Johansen Procedure 
Cointegrating equation: 
LnPPI = f (LnEX, MR, EXP, LnGCOMP) 
Coefficient t-statistic 
LnPPI 1.0000  
LnPGDP -0.7756 -2.8178** 
MR 0.0727 1.7209* 
EXP 0.1663 2.8791** 
LnGCOMP -0.0235 -4.5799*** 
Notes:   
1. ** and *** denote significance at 5% and 1% level respectively. 
2. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion. 
3. D98 and interactive dummies are treated as exogenous I(0) variables in the           
cointegrating equation. 
 
The cointegration test results are presented in Table 8. The number of 
co-integrating vectors r is determined by reference to the λmax and the trace statistics. 
As can be seen, the Trace statistics indicate that there are two cointegrating vectors 
among the four variables at 5% significant level while the λmax statistic indicates 
that there is only one cointegration among the variables. I will proceed on the 
analysis with one cointegrating vector.  
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The next step is to identify the cointegrating vectors. The estimated 
cointegrating equation is reported in the Table 9. All variables in cointegrating 
equation carry the expected signs. The completion of HOS housing unit (LnGCOMP) 
is positively related to the LnPPI. The coefficient is very significant, while the 
positive effect is modest compared to that of LnPGDP on the housing price. In 
contrast to the widely held view that the supply of HOS housing would generate 
negative impact on the prices of private housing market, the findings indicate that 
HOS housing is an important part in the Hong Kong housing ecology and it is 
beneficial to both the public housing tenants and private housing owners in the long 
run.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This study attempts to investigate the disequilibrium dynamics of private 
housing market in Hong Kong. By using the cointegration approach, the paper 
identifies two stable cointegrating relations, ie. a long run demand side relation 
between property price, prime rate, income, price expectation and stock of private 
houisng, and supply side relation between private housing completion, property price, 
prime rate and land cost, which shows a short run disequilibrium dynamics in 
demand and supply of private housing during 1988 – 2008. Between 1985 and 1997, 
the demand of the stock of housing in general appears to have been above its long 
run desired level while the supply of housing has been relative stable, moving around 
its long run desired level. There had been a positive supply shock and negative 
demand shock from 1998 to 2003. Impulse response and variance decomposition 
indicate that private housing completion responses very slowly to shock in housing 
price indicating a main source of inefficiency in the housing market. The findings 
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also indicate that the supply of HOS housing will not produce negative impacts on 
the price housing sector.  
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Table 10.  List of Variables and their Definitions 
 
Short form 
  
Description 
  
Data Sources 
 
LnPPI  Log property price index (overall 
private domestic housing market 
1999=100) 
 Hong Kong Property Review, 
Rating and Valuation Dept 
HKSAR Government 
 
LnCOMP  Log Private Residential 
Completion Unit (average of 
current period and its past three 
quarters) 
 Hong Kong Monthly Digest of 
Statistics, Hong Kong Census 
and Statistics Dept, HKSAR 
Government 
 
LnFCOMP  Log Private Residential 
Completion Unit (2 years total 
completion) 
 Hong Kong Monthly Digest of 
Statistics, Hong Kong Census 
and Statistics Dept, HKSAR 
Government 
 
LnGCOMP  Log Subsidized sales Residential 
Completion Unit (No. of HOS 
housing unit completed by HA 
and HS) 
 Hong Kong Monthly Digest of 
Statistics, Hong Kong Census 
and Statistics Dept, HKSAR 
Government 
 
LnPSTOCK  Log Private Housing Stock (No. 
of unit) 
 Hong Kong Monthly Digest of 
Statistics, Hong Kong Census 
and Statistics Dept, HKSAR 
Government 
 
LnPGDP 
 
 
 Log Gross Domestic Product, Per 
capita (Current price, seasonal 
adjusted) 
 Hong Kong Census and 
Statistics Dept, HKSAR 
Government 
 
LnLAND 
 
 
 Log Estimated Land Price per 
GFA sq. m (Current Price) 
 Unpublished Statistics 
conducted by the Censes and 
Statistics Dept, HKSAR 
Government 
 
EXPInverse  Inverse of Housing price 
expectation: The property market 
yields: E / P*100 mins the 
3-months Hong Kong deposit rate 
(in percentage) 
 
 Hong Kong Property Review, 
various years, Rating and 
Valuation Dept and Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin, various 
issues, HKMA 
 
PR   Prime Rate (in percentage)  Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
various issues, HKMA 
 
. 
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